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UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL EFFECTS OF TRUMP’S
CHINA TARIFFS
DANIEL C.K. CHOW*
IAN M. SHELDON**
ABSTRACT
Although President Trump has persistently claimed that
China is paying billions of dollars in tariffs imposed on Chinese
imports to the United States, empirical evidence indicates that U.S.
consumers are bearing the cost of the tariffs: $51 billion in increased
prices and a net loss of $7.2 billion to the U.S. economy. The unilateral power-based approach to trade used by the Trump Administration has also resulted in unexpected economic and political
costs in key Midwestern states that helped propel Trump to the
U.S. presidency in 2016. These costs have led to reverses for the
Trump Administration in the mid-term elections of 2018 and could
ensue in further electoral losses.
As both political parties currently hold little affection for
China, the United States could continue to use tariffs against China
and other countries as trade policy no matter which party controls
the U.S. presidency. For these reasons, a study of how to most effectively use a power-based approach to trade is both useful and timely.
This study indicates that a power-based approach can be
used most effectively against countries that lack either the economic power or the political will to engage the United States in a
prolonged trade standoff. While most nations appear to fall into
one or both of these categories, China is not one of them. China
has the economic power to fight a trade war, and China believes
it must stand up to the United States. When used against China,
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the power-based approach carries greater risks because its economic and political effects are difficult to predict and because
this approach is inherently more uncertain than the cooperative
approach of the World Trade Organization that the United States
has rejected. Using a power-based approach against China could
backfire because China has the economic power and political will
to endure a prolonged battle and play a dangerous game of mutual pain and destruction with the United States.

2021] UNDERSTANDING TRUMP’S CHINA TARIFFS

275

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 276
I. BACKGROUND TO THE U.S.-CHINA TRADE WAR ....................... 285
A. The Trump Administration and Economic
Nationalism......................................................................... 285
B. Tariffs and Trade Under the WTO ................................... 288
C. Paralysis of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body................ 293
D. The U.S. Power-Based Approach to International
Trade ................................................................................... 296
II. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE U.S.-CHINA TRADE
WAR ......................................................................................... 296
A. Power-Based Bargaining and Tariffs ............................... 296
B. The Economic Costs of Power-Based Bargaining ............. 301
C. The Impact of Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Agriculture .... 307
D. U.S. Agriculture and the U.S.-China Trade Agreement .. 311
E. Domestic Political Effects of the U.S.-China Trade War .. 314
1. Trade Liberalization and Economic Nationalism ......... 314
2. The Trade War and U.S. Voting Behavior ..................... 319
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 324


276 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:273
INTRODUCTION
The Trump Administration has persistently boasted that the
billions of dollars in punitive tariffs imposed on imported Chinese
goods as part of the U.S.-China trade war begun in 2018 are being
paid by China to the U.S. Treasury.1 For example, on February 14,
2020, President Trump stated the following in his remarks to
state governors: “China is paying us, right now, billions and billions of dollars of tariffs a month. Every month, billions of dollars. I
love it. Personally, I love it. But they’re paying billions of dollars.
And it’s hurting them; it’s not good for them.”2
Trump has made this bold claim repeatedly without offering
any explanation or elaboration.3 Yet, this claim is inconsistent with
orthodox economic theory, widely accepted by economists and trade
lawyers alike, which holds that the consumers of the country imposing the tariffs—the United States—bear the brunt of the tariffs.4
Under the orthodox theory, a tariff is a tax on an import that
must be paid before the import is allowed to exit the customs port
of entry and enter into the internal market.5 The importer of record,
1 Ben Werschkul, Trump Made This False Claim About China and Tariffs
at Least 108 Times in 2019, YAHOO (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.yahoo.com/now
/trump-has-made-this-false-claim-about-china-and-tariffs-at-least-100-times
-182318319.html [https://perma.cc/UH2E-LGBM] (noting that Trump claimed
at least 108 times in 2019 that China was paying for tariffs).
2 Brooks Jackson, Does China Pay Tariffs?, FACTCHECK.ORG (Feb. 28,
2019), https://www.factcheck.org/2019/02/does-china-pay-tariffs/ [https://perma
.cc/3TFM-JUL3]. A more detailed breakdown of the tariffs is set forth below.
See infra Part II.
3 Trump has made this claim over 100 times. Werschkul, supra note 1.
4 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW 201–02 (3d ed. 2017). Most observers reject this claim and assert that
U.S. consumers are paying for the tariffs. See Jeanna Smialek & Ana Swanson,
American Consumers, Not China, Are Paying for Trump’s Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/business/economy/trade
-war-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/UYD9-4TVL]; Howard Schneider, Americans,
Not Chinese, Pay Trump Tariffs: NY Fed Study, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-tariffs/americans-not-chinese-pay
-trump-tariffs-ny-fed-study-idUSKBN1XZ2A4 [https://perma.cc/A633-MN4C];
Asher Stockler, New Study Confirms That Trump’s Claim About China Paying
for Cost of U.S. Tariffs Is Untrue, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www
.newsweek.com/trump-trade-war-china-tariffs-study-1453160 [https://perma
.cc/NL2K-2PAR].
5 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 213.
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a U.S. entity, must pay the tax (or post a bond).6 The exporter is
not responsible for the tariff, which is normally the responsibility
of the importer.7 The importer then normally passes on the cost of
the tariff by including it in the price charged to the wholesale distributor or retailer of the goods.8 In turn, the distributor or retailer then passes on the cost of the tariff to the consumer, the
ultimate purchaser.9 Prices of like domestic products will also
increase.10 Not only will high cost inefficient domestic producers
raise prices but low cost efficient producers, who do not need the
protection of the tariff, will also raise prices; the tariff acts as a
subsidy to all domestic producers and the increase in domestic
prices is an additional “tax” on consumers.11 The tariff can also
6 Id. Most exporters and importers will hire a freight forwarder, a professional service provider, to handle the logistics of the export-importer transaction,
including compliance with Customs. Jared Vineyard, What Does a Freight Forwarder Do & Do You Need One?, UNIVERSALCARGO (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www
.universalcargo.com/what-does-a-freight-forwarder-do-do-you-need-one/ [https://
perma.cc/V373-5PKX]. On the export side, the freight forwarder handles the
customs issues for the exporter and arranges for multimodal transportation, including ocean carriage and inland transport (and insurance if required) of the
goods from the nation of the exporter to the nation of the importer. Id. On the
import side, the freight forwarder will file the paperwork for the importer with
Customs and pay the tariff or post a bond. See id. The freight forward makes
the initial tariff determination and calculation of the tariff. The final computation of the tariff, made by U.S. Customs authorities, is called “liquidation” and
full payment of the tariff must be made before the goods are released. CHOW &
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 213. Computation can take several days or longer
so most importers will file a summary entry form and post a bond as security
for the tariff due that will allow the goods to be immediately released. See id.
7 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 213.
8 Id. at 201–02, 213–14.
9 Id.
10 See Howard Gleckman, What Is A Tariff and Who Pays It?, TAX POL’Y
CTR. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/what-tariff-and
-who-pays-it [https://perma.cc/9T67-LT8W].
11 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 201. Efficient producers are those
low-cost producers that are not harmed by the imports due to superior technology
or management. See Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A
Critique of Piecemeal Accession, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 539, 552 (1995). They do not
need the protection of the tariff and do not need to raise their prices because they
are already profitable. See id. Only inefficient high cost producers need the protection of the tariff. See id. at 555. However, because the tariff on the imports and
price increases by inefficient producers allow them to increase prices, most efficient
producers will raise their prices in order to earn higher profits. See Gleckman,
supra note 10.
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have a negative impact on the country of the exporters as it reduces
demand for their products; tariffs are a form of trade protectionism
that protects domestic industry by limiting import competition.12
The tariff that is collected by the Customs authorities is
revenue for the U.S. government that is paid by the consumer,
who ultimately bears the cost.13 The standard textbook result is
that the gains to the U.S. government and domestic producers are
less than the loss to consumers resulting in an overall deadweight
loss to the U.S. economy.14 Although the tariff normally results
in a deadweight loss, the tariff could have highly visible beneficial
effects on the protected domestic industry, especially if it was in
obvious financial distress.15
Although this is an overview of how most economists view
the costs of tariffs, this is a theory of rational human behavior
that can, of course, vary in any particular case. If the tariff is a
temporary measure, it is possible that the importer or the distributor might decide to absorb the cost of the tariff or pass on
only a portion of the tariff to the consumer.16 This would mean that
the importer or distributor would earn lower profits, but such a
decision can be a rational one if the market conditions dictate,
for example, that either no increase or only a small increase in
price will be tolerated by consumers in the short term.17 It is also
possible that the exporter will discount its prices, at least temporarily, to the U.S. importer to help offset the price increases to
the distributor or consumer.18 The exporter might also agree in
the sales contract to reimburse the importer in part or whole for
the tariff paid.19 At this point, the costs of the tariffs are shared
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 202.
Id. at 201.
14 Id. For one view of the economic losses and the effect on GDP, see Erica
York, Tracking the Impact of U.S. Tariffs and Retaliatory Actions, TAX FOUND.
(Feb. 14, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/tariffs-trump-trade-war/ [https://perma
.cc/A4GX-8AEX].
15 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 202.
16 See Rajesh Kumar Singh, Explainer: Trump’s China Tariffs—Paid by
U.S. Importers, Not by China, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-tariffs-explainer-idUSKCN1UR5YZ [https://
perma.cc/L6F6-BHX5].
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See Century Importers, Inc. v. United States, 205 F.3d 1308, 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (under sales contract, importer paid the tariff to clear customs but
would later be reimbursed by exporter).
12
13
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between the exporting nation and the importing nation.20 In all
scenarios, a change in any of these variables will affect the ultimate
costs of the tariffs and who bears them.21 Basic economic theory
also does not account for any political effects of tariffs, such as on
midterm U.S. elections in 2018.22 Only an in-depth empirical study
of these variables can clarify which entity or entities bear the cost
of the China tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration, the total amount of the costs, particular industries or groups bearing
disproportionate costs, and the political effects of the tariffs. This
Article sets forth the results of detailed empirical economic studies
of the redistributive effects of the U.S. tariffs imposed on Chinese
imports by the Trump Administration as part of the ongoing U.S.China trade war that began in 2018.23 The Article also examines
the economic effects of the retaliatory tariffs imposed by China on
U.S. imports.24 In addition, as the economic effects of tariffs often
have political consequences, this Article also examines the political effects of the China tariffs in post-2016 elections, including
the midterm elections of 2018.25 This study is timely because the
United States is likely to continue to use tariffs as a matter of trade
policy against China and other countries, no matter which political party controls the U.S. presidency.26 In setting forth this study,
this Article emphasizes the following three major points.
First, the Trump Administration’s power-based approach to
tariffs, which involves the unilateral imposition of punitive tariffs,
often without legal justification, is most effective when the targeted nation, as in the case of South Korea or the European Union, immediately capitulates and offers trade concessions.27 A
See Singh, supra note 16.
See Gleckman, supra note 10.
22 See Robert Holleyman et al., 2018 Midterm Elections Update: Impact on
U.S. Trade Policy, CROWELL MORING (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.cmtradelaw
.com/2018/11/2018-midterm-elections-update-impact-on-u-s-trade-policy/ [https://
perma.cc/7S6L-2W3S].
23 See infra Part II.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See William Mauldin & Siobhan Hughes, Broad Support for Trump’s
China Fight Faces Test as Tariffs Escalate, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2019), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/broad-support-for-trumps-china-fight-faces-test-as-tar
iffs-escalate-11557658801 [https://perma.cc/7PST-T7P6].
27 For a detailed discussion of South Korea and U.S. trade pressure, see infra Conclusion.
20
21
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power-based approach is less effective against a country like China,
which for economic and political reasons, refuses to immediately
make concessions to avoid punitive tariffs, but is willing to engage
the United States in a prolonged standoff.28 In the case of the China
tariffs, empirical analysis shows unequivocally that the cost of the
tariffs has been passed almost entirely to the U.S. consumer,
contrary to the assertion of the Trump Administration.29 In addition to imposing $51 billion in costs to U.S. consumers due to
increased prices, the tariffs have resulted in a deadweight loss (or
aggregate loss) of $7.3 billion to the U.S. economy.30 At the same
time, China has also suffered economic losses as the tariffs have
reduced demand for Chinese imports, leading to a contraction in
China’s export driven economy for this same period.31 The China
tariffs indicate that when the targeted country engages the United
States in a standoff, the economies of both countries suffer mutual
destruction by the unilaterally U.S. imposed tariffs.32 The country
that concedes first and capitulates will be the country that is unable
or unwilling to bear further economic harm.33 As the United States
has the most powerful economy in the world, the United States may
be able to use a power-based approach against many, if not most,
other countries as these countries may lack the economic power or
political will (or both) to engage the United States in a standoff.34
Second, when the targeted country not only engages the
United States in a prolonged standoff but also imposes retaliatory
tariffs on the United States, the economic effects become even
See Chad P. Bown, The 2018 US-China Trade Conflict After 40 Years of
Special Protection 12 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 19-7,
2019), https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/2018-us-china-trade
-conflict-after-40-years-special-protection [https://perma.cc/CF8B-ATEJ].
29 See infra Section II.B.
30 See id.
31 Kenneth Rapoza, Here Is How China Is Really ‘Paying’ for Tariffs, FORBES
(May 17, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/05/17/here-is-how
-china-is-really-paying-for-tariffs/#11711b3a1fae [https://perma.cc/GQU4-DXFF].
32 See Bown, supra note 28, at 3.
33 See Keith Bradsher, China’s Hard-Liners Win a Round in Trump’s Trade
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/14/busi
ness/china-trade-hardliners.html [https://perma.cc/NE4B-SWUW].
34 See Daniel C.K. Chow, United States Unilateralism and the World
Trade Organization, 37 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 26 (2019) [hereinafter United States
Unilateralism].
28
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more unpredictable and uncertain.35 In the U.S.-China trade war,
China has imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products
to cause maximum pain and distress.36 U.S. agricultural exports,
such as soybeans, are particularly vulnerable to retaliation as
China buys about 50 percent of all U.S. soybean exports.37 Although
the costs of the tariffs on U.S. agricultural imports will also be
passed on to Chinese consumers, China has been able to avoid
the bulk of these ill effects as China has met its demand through
trade diversion, for example, by buying soybeans from other
sources, such as Brazil and Argentina.38 The data indicate that
significant volumes of trade in soybeans has been diverted from
the United States mostly to Brazil and other countries.39 For the
United States, the result of the China retaliatory tariffs on soybeans and other agricultural products is reduced demand for
U.S. production.40 The reduction in U.S. exports to China has also
caused additional economic harm that must be added to the economic harm caused to U.S. consumers by the U.S. tariffs on
Chinese imports.41 The additional harm from retaliation to the
United States could tip the balance of harms in favor of the targeted nation in some cases.42
Third, the political effects of the tariffs and retaliatory
tariffs of the U.S.-China trade war were also hard to predict at the
start of the conflict.43 The data indicate that much of the economic harm from both the U.S. imposed tariffs and the retaliatory
tariffs has been concentrated in the Midwestern region of the
United States that helped propel Trump to the presidency in the
2016 election.44 The United States has attempted to offset some
See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.C.
37 See infra Part II.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See Michael K. Adjemian et al., Tariff Retaliation Weakened the U.S.
Soybean Basis, 34 CHOICES 1, 1–2 (2019), https://www.choicesmagazine.org
/UserFiles/file/cmsarticle722.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ABD-8S9G].
42 See Stockler, supra note 4.
43 See Jennifer Haberkorn & Tracy Wilkinson, Congress Debates Ways to
Punish China over Virus, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2020, at A6, https://www.latimes
.com/politics/story/2020-04-30/congress-looks-at-options-to-punish-china-over
-the-corornavirus-outbreak (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).
44 See infra Part II.
35
36
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of these harms by providing subsidies, for example, financial payments, to U.S. farmers, but the subsidies have been unable to
completely offset losses.45 The United States has also attempted to
ameliorate the harm caused by China’s agricultural tariffs by
extracting a commitment from China to purchase in 2020 and
2021, respectively, $36.5 and $43.5 billion in U.S. agricultural
products under the 2020 U.S.-China Trade Agreement (USCTA)
reached on January 14, 2020.46 However, the data also indicate
that it is unlikely that China will be able to fully meet these
commitments and that the effects of the retaliatory tariffs will
continue to burden key Midwestern states.47 These data indicate
that the U.S.-instigated trade war with China may backfire on the
Trump Administration by eroding support in states that voted
for Trump in 2016.48 These data also indicate that the use of a
power-based approach to trade is risky and can lead to unpredictable and unintended consequences when the targeted nation
has the political will and economic ability to engage in a prolonged standoff with the United States.49
See id.
See Dorcas Wong & Alexander Chipman Koty, The US-China Trade War:
A Timeline, CHINA BRIEFING (May 13, 2020), https://www.china-briefing.com
/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline [https://perma.cc/25TD-SEA5]. The
USCTA also suspended some of the U.S. tariffs and China also agreed to suspend some tariffs on the United States. See id.; infra text accompanying notes
83, 85. The effect of the USCTA is to suspend the U.S.-China trade war, at
least in part. (Many of the tariffs on both sides still exist). Id. The official text
of the USCTA is available at OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
ECONOMIC AND TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (2020) [hereinafter USCTA], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agree
ments/phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between
_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/WHW7-HJWL].
47 See Laura Reiley, China Could Purchase Much Less U.S. Farm Product
Than Thought, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/2020/02/20/china-could-purchase-much-less-us-farm-product-than
-thought-new-usda-estimate-suggests/ [https://perma.cc/9XRL-8XPV]; Phillipe
Legrain, Why China Will Win the Trade War, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/13/why-china-will-win-the-trade-war/ [https://
perma.cc/MRA2-JECK].
48 See Pablo D. Fajgelbaum et al., The Return to Protectionism, 135 Q.J.
ECON. 1, 49 (2020).; see also infra Part II.
49 See Matt Egan, It’s an Insane Time for Trump to Pick (Another) Fight
with China, CNN (May 4, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/01/business
/trump-china-coronavirus-trade-war/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZY3K-MK9B].
45
46
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This study of the economic and political effects of a powerbased approach to trade is timely because although the Trump
Administration was the first to use this approach with China,
U.S. hostility towards China did not start with and will likely not
end with President Trump.50 The current United States Trade
Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer, a well-known China
and World Trade Organization (WTO) critic, and the chief architect of current U.S. trade policy, was approved by both houses of
Congress by overwhelming majorities.51 Skepticism about China
is one of the few issues that both political parties in Congress
find common ground.52 Given the current hostile attitude towards China in both political parties,53 the United States may
continue to use a power-based approach to trade with China (as
well as other countries) regardless of which political party wins
the U.S. presidency. For these reasons, it is useful to evaluate
the risks and utility associated with such an approach.
The limits of a power-based approach do not mean that it
cannot be an effective strategy for the United States. Aside from
questions of its legality under the WTO,54 the United States can
use such an approach effectively if it first carefully analyzes the
political and economic status of the targeted country as well as
areas in which trade retaliation may occur.55 Our conclusion, based
See Mauldin & Hughes, supra note 26.
Roll Call Vote 115th Congress - 1st Session: On the Nomination (Confirmation Robert Lighthizer, of Florida, to be United States Trade Representative), U.S. SENATE (May 11, 2017), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll
_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=1&vote=00127 [https://
perma.cc/L5F6-SPRM]; Andrew Restuccia & Megan Cassella, ‘Ideological Soulmates’: How a China Skeptic Sold Trump on a Trade War, POLITICO (Dec. 26,
2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/26/trump-lighthizer-china-trade-war
-1075221 [https://perma.cc/J599-MKDD].
52 Haberkorn & Wilkinson, supra note 43, at A6.
53 Id.
54 Such an approach is inconsistent with the obligations of the United
States under the WTO, although this issue does not seem to be much of a
concern to the United States. See infra Section I.B.
55 See Aaditya Mattoo & Robert W. Staiger, Trade Wars: What Do They
Mean? Why Are They Happening Now? What Are the Costs?, 1, 6 (Nat’l Bureau
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25762, 2019), https://www.nber.org/system
/files/working_papers/w25762/w25762.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM29-ZPA5]; see
also infra text accompanying note 154.
50
51
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on the data, is that the power-based approach can be used most
effectively against countries that lack the political will or economic ability to engage the United States in a standoff.56 The
power-based approach involves more risk when used against
countries, such as China, that for political and economic reasons
believes that it must stand up to the United States and engage
the United States in a prolonged standoff.57 Against these types
of countries, the power-based approach could lead to greater uncertainty and less unpredictability in economic and political results, and could backfire.58 A careful study of the probable responses
of the targeted country may reduce some of these uncertainties,
but may not eliminate them entirely as a power-based approach
involves many different variables and so is inherently less predictable than the cooperative approach, based on treaty negotiation, that is the hallmark of trade under the WTO.59
This Article will develop these main points by proceeding
as follows. Part I will explain the background to the U.S.-China
trade war and will explain in further detail how the tariff system
of the United States works in practice. Part I will also examine
the power-based approach of the United States used in defiance
of its legal obligations under the WTO. A key component of this
approach is that the United States has been able to disable the
dispute settlement system of the WTO by paralyzing the WTO
Appellate Body.60 The United States has installed a parallel system of dispute resolution involving China’s USCTA and WTO
obligations that is under the complete control and domination by
the United States.61 Part II examines the empirical effects of the
56 For examples involving the effective use of the power-based approach
against South Korea and the European Union, see infra Conclusion.
57 Ana Swanson & Keith Bradsher, U.S.-China Trade Standoff May Be Initial Skirmish in Broader Economic War, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/11/world/asia/us-china-trade-war.html [https://perma
.cc/GJ52-HDMV].
58 See infra Part II.
59 In contrast to a power-based approach favored by the United States, the
WTO model of trade relations is based on multilateralism, negotiation, and
consensus. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4.
60 See Daniel C.K. Chow, A New and Controversial Approach to Dispute
Resolution under the 2020 United States–China Trade Agreement, HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter New & Controversial Approach].
61 See id. at 22.
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tariffs. The tariffs have resulted in some unexpected economic
and political costs and may backfire.62 The Conclusion will give
some policy recommendations based on the conclusions reached
in Part II to help guide further U.S. tariff policy.
I.BACKGROUND TO THE U.S.-CHINA TRADE WAR
A. The Trump Administration and Economic Nationalism
Although the United States has long been critical of China’s
trade practices, U.S. policy reached a new level of assertiveness
with the ascension of Donald J. Trump to the U.S. presidency in
2016.63 A signature slogan of the Trump Administration during
the election process was “America First,” a set of policies that echo
economic nationalism from the 1930s, a period in which trade
protectionism reached a peak that preceded the Second World
War.64 Trump was able to exploit simmering resentment against
China and the negative impact of trade effects that had been
building up for years and that fueled a rising populism.65 His
message that the United States was being exploited by China and
other trading partners who reaped the major benefits of trade to
the detriment of the United States resonated with a large segment
of the electorate.66 Trump’s assertiveness against China and his
call for a revival of economic nationalism was a key component of
his election to the U.S. presidency.67
See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48.
See New & Controversial Approach, supra note 60, at 3–4.
64 See Daniel C.K. Chow, Ian M. Sheldon, & William McGuire, The Revival
of Economic Nationalism and the Global Trading System, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2133, 2134–36 (2019).
65 See Daniel C.K. Chow, William McGuire, & Ian M. Sheldon, A Legal and
Economic Critique of President Trump’s China Trade Policies, 79 U. PITT. L.
REV. 205, 211, 213, 219–20 (2017).
66 CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT, AMERICA’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE UNDER DONALD
TRUMP 1, 10–11, 19–20 (Xenia Wicket ed., 2017), https://www.chathamhouse
.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-18-americas-international
-role-trump-wickett-final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/74M4-LD6U].
67 See Luis Da Vinta, Competition, Conflict, and Conformity: Foreign Policy
Making in the First Year of the Trump Presidency, 49 PRESIDENTIAL STUDS. Q.
280, 280–81 (2019); Edward Alden, The Roots of Trump’s Trade Rage, POLITICO
(Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01 /the-roots-of
-trumps-trade-rage-214639 [https://perma.cc/M7XD-5JEZ].
62
63
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Although the United States has complaints against many
trading partners, the United States singled out China for especially harsh criticism.68 The Trump Administration focused on the
following problematic aspects of China’s trade policies: (1) unfair
Chinese trade practices that increased the U.S. trade deficit with
China to a record $420 billion in 2018;69 (2) state intervention in
the internal market to favor China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
at the expense of U.S. companies;70 and (3) state policies that encouraged the theft of U.S. intellectual property and forced technology transfer.71 Trump also castigated prior U.S. administrations
for weak policies that allowed China to exploit its trading relationship with the United States.72
In following up on his campaign positions, Trump took
aggressive measures to pressure U.S. trading partners into reordering their trading relationships with the United States.73 In 2018,
the United States began to impose tariffs on a worldwide basis.74
On February 7, 2018, the United States imposed “global safeguard
tariffs” by placing a 30 percent tariffs on all imports of solar panels
worth $8.5 billion (except those from Canada) and a 20 percent
tariff on all imports of washing machines worth $1.8 billion.75 On
March 23, 2018, the United States imposed a tariff of 25 percent
on all worldwide steel imports (except from Argentina, Australia,
68 Simon Tisdall, Money Wars: How Sanctions and Tariffs Became Trump’s
Big Guns, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2018/aug/19/trump-money-wars-economic-sanctions-trade-tar
iffs-backfiring [https://perma.cc/J6DJ-462S].
69 The People’s Republic of China, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-repub
lic-china [https://perma.cc/S7XD-T2R5].
70 See Daniel C.K. Chow, The Myth of China’s Open Market Reforms and
the World Trade Organization, 41 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 939, 948–51 (2020).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 942–44.
73 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 TRADE POLICY AGENDA
AND 2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 3, 6 (2018) [hereinafter USTR POLICY AGENDA
& ANNUAL REPORT], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018
/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/59PL-6BLY].
74 Robin Levinson-King & Daniele Palumbo, Donald Trump v. The World:
US Tariffs in Four Charts, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.bbc.com
/news/world-us-canada-45415861 [https://perma.cc/UWL5-6T8Z].
75 Wong & Koty, supra note 46.
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Brazil, and South Korea) and a 10 percent tariff on all worldwide
aluminum imports (except from Argentina and Australia).76
The United States singled out China for especially draconian treatment to pressure it into making trade concessions: In
escalating fashion, the United States proposed “trade actions lists”
of tariffs on selected Chinese goods of $34 billion (April 6, 2018),77
$16 billion (June 20, 2018),78 $200 billion (July 17, 2018),79 and
$300 billion (May 17, 2019).80 In total, tariffs were to be imposed
on $550 billion of imports or virtually all imports from China.81
In response, China imposed tariffs on $150 billion of imports from
the United States.82 Subsequently, as a result of signing Phase I
of the USCTA on January 14, 2020, the United States suspended
or reduced tariffs on $300 billion of Chinese imports, leaving tariffs
on $250 billion in place with further reductions linked to future
agreement by China on Phase II of the USCTA.83 In exchange,
under the USCTA, China agreed to purchase $200 billion in U.S.
goods and services;84 China also agreed a proportionate reduction of its tariffs on U.S. goods.85
Id.
$34 Billion Trade Action (List 1), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301
-china/34-billion-trade-action [https://perma.cc/G4JE-RYLT].
78 $16 Billion Trade Action (List 2), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/sec
tion-301-china/16-billion-trade-action [https://perma.cc/CMQ8-Y5KU].
79 $200 Billion Trade Action (List 3), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301
-china/200-billion-trade-action [https://perma.cc/J9UC-7F6A].
80 $300 Billion Trade Action (List 4), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301
-china/300-billion-trade-action [https://perma.cc/37L9-22L6].
81 USTR Statement on Section 301 Tariff Action Regarding China, OFF. OF
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 23, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us
/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/august/ustr-statement-section-301
-tariff#:~:text=In [https://perma.cc/3NAS-NV7K].
82 BROCK R. WILLIAMS & KEIGH E. HAMMOND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45949,
U.S.-CHINA TARIFF ACTIONS BY THE NUMBERS, 1, 5 fig. 1 (2019), https://fas.org
/sgp/crs/row/R45949.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RTQ-UTVD].
83 Wong & Koty, supra note 46.
84 Id.
85 Id.
76
77
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The Trump Administration’s aggressive use of trade sanctions has been controversial on several fronts.86 Not only did the
severity and scope of the sanctions shock U.S. trading partners,
the sanctions were in breach of and inconsistent with the rules
of the multilateral trading system established by the WTO and its
predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
that have governed international trade for nearly seven decades.87
The United States’ response to claims of illegality under the WTO
was to launch a decisive attack on the WTO and to assert a bold
defiance of established WTO norms.88
B. Tariffs and Trade Under the WTO
The use of tariffs on imports is a component of the trade
policy of most nations in the modern global economy.89 Each of
the 164 member nations of the WTO use tariffs and has a tariff
schedule that is filed with the WTO90 and is made part of annexes
to the GATT, which regulates international trade in goods.91
Simon Tisdall, Money Wars: How Sanctions and Tariffs Became Trump’s
Big Guns, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2018/aug/19/trump-money-wars-economic-sanctions-trade-tariffs
-backfiring [https://perma.cc/J6DJ-462S].
87 David J. Lynch, Trump’s China Tariffs Violate Global Trade Rules, WTO
Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2020, 5:10 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/business/2020/09/15/wto-trump-china-trade/ [https://perma.cc/MUE8-U4TK].
88 Adam Behsudi, Trump Ramps Up Attack Against WTO, POLITICO (July 26,
2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/26/trump-world-trade-organiza
tion-1623192 [https://perma.cc/P228-8Z96].
89 OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT USER’S TOOLKIT 12 (2012),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/policyareas/trade/PFItoolkitTRADE
.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVE9-AFZQ].
90 An official publication of the WTO explains GATT/WTO schedules for
goods and services. See What Is a WTO Schedule?, WTO, https://www.wto.org
/english/news_e/news17_e/mark_27jul17_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CGX4-TVG8].
The tariff schedule of each WTO members and other tariff information can be
accessed from the official website on the member’s country page on the WTO
website. For the United States, see United States of America and the WTO,
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/usa_e.htm [https://perma
.cc/N7LH-MPX4].
91 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, art. I, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994)
[hereinafter GATT 1994].
86
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Each tariff schedule sets forth tariff rates for each imported
product and it is possible to classify all products under these
schedules.92 Goods are classified in accordance with the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description
and Coding System of 1988, a unified system known as the
Harmonized Convention.93 All WTO countries have adopted the
Harmonized Convention;94 the United States adopted the Convention as the basis for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States (HTSUS).95 Once a good is classified in accordance
with the HTSUS, then the tariff rate associated with that classification is applied.96 Under the HTSUS, the United States uses a
10-digit system of classification.97 The tariff is determined at the
8-digit level known as the “tariff line.”98 The 10-digit number is
used for information gathering purposes and is not related to the
92 For

example, for China’s tariff schedules, see China’s goods schedules on
China’s country webpage, China and the WTO, WTO, https://www.wto.org
/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm [https://perma.cc/5XGT-LB8H].
93 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 152–53 (4th ed. 2020) [hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS].
94 Id. at 152.
95 Id. at 153.
96 Id. at 152.
97 About Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.usitc.gov/tariff_affairs/about_hts.htm [https://perma.cc/EV4E-H9JJ].
The first two digits are the broadest category indicating a chapter. See CHOW
& SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 93, at
152. There are 99 chapters with the lower numbers indicating goods closer to
nature and higher numbers indicating increasing complexity and industrialization of the goods. Id. For example “04” indicates dairy products, such as
eggs. Get Tariff Data, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tariffs_e/tar
iff_data_e.htm [https://perma.cc/5XGT-LB8H]. The next two digits indicate a
heading under the chapter, so “0403” refers to products derived from milk. Id.
The next two digits then indicate a subheading within the chapter and heading, e.g., “040310” is the subheading for yoghurt. Id. At this point—the sixdigit line—this classification is uniform throughout all WTO countries. See
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note
93, at 152. Beyond the six-digit number, national variations are allowed to
occur. Get Tariff Data, supra. An example of an eight-digit line is “0403.10.11”
(e.g., “low-fat yoghurt”). Id. This is the tariff line or the line at which the tariff
is imposed. Id. The ten-digit line used by the United States is for information
purposes only. See id.
98 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra
note 93, at 153.
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calculation of the amount of the tariff.99 Under the Harmonized
Convention, all tariff classifications are uniform among WTO
countries up to the 6-digit level;100 beyond that level, national
variations are allowed to occur.101 As a result, a high level of international uniformity and predictability in the use of tariffs has
been achieved with the help of the WTO.102
Goods imported from China and all other WTO members
into the United States are subject to tariffs determined in accordance with the HTSUS.103 The HTSUS represents a bargain
that the United States made with all other WTO members to apply
the agreed upon (“bound”) rates and not higher rates.104 Under the
WTO, like all other members, the United States is allowed to depart from its agreed upon tariffs in the HTSUS and to impose a
higher tariff only under carefully circumscribed limits set forth in
the GATT and other WTO agreements.105 For example, if the
United States experiences a sudden and unexpected surge in
imports from Country A, the United States could suffer harm to its
domestic industries.106 If imports flood the internal market, prices
will be driven downward and domestic manufacturers of products
that compete with the imports could suffer financial losses.107 To
allow these domestic companies some breathing room, the United
States is allowed to use a “safeguard” and depart from its HTSUS
tariff rate for the import.108 As a safeguard, the United States is
allowed by the WTO to impose a higher tariff or to impose a quantitative limit or a quota on the imports on a temporary basis.109
Other examples that justify the imposition of a higher tariff is
Id. at 153.
Id. at 152.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 153.
104 U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/callout/us-harmonized-tariff-schedule-hts
[https://perma.cc/GUU5-E5FK].
105 Tariffs: More Binding and Closer to Zero, WTO, https://www.wto.org
/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm2_e.htm [https://perma.cc/9R3P-AT3W].
106 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 399.
107 Id.
108 19 U.S.C. § 2251. Agreement on Safeguards, WTO, https://www.wto.org
/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm [https://perma.cc/3NRJ-P42B]
109 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
99
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an anti-dumping duty, which is an additional tariff to offset
“dumped” imports, i.e., imports sold at artificially low prices to
secure a foothold in the import market.110 An additional tariff,
known as a countervailing duty, is also allowed when used to
offset subsidies, i.e., financial contributions, made by the government of the exporter to allow the exporter to charge a lower
price for its export and to gain an economic advantage over domestic competitors in the import market.111 These types of tariffs, called safeguards, anti-dumping duties, and countervailing
duties, are the most common types of additional tariffs used in
international trade that are justified departures from the tariff
rates set forth in national schedules.112
In the case of China, the United States imposed a wideranging set of tariffs that did not fit into any of the categories of
justified tariff increases discussed above.113 The United States
justified most of the China tariffs through use of Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974,114 which authorizes the United States to
impose trade sanctions if an investigation determines that a
country has violated its WTO obligations, has engaged in acts,
policies, or practices that are unjustified, unreasonable, or discriminatory and that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.115
A problematic component of Section 301 is that it appears to
authorize the United States to find a violation of another country’s
110 See id.; CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 467–70. Anti-dumping
duties are authorized by GATT Art. VI and the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, Anti-Dumping Agreement (Implementation of Article VI of the GATT),
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/anti_dumping
_e.htm [https://perma.cc/F7YU-SDY9].
111 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 467–68. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671.
Countervailing duties are authorized by GATT Article VI and the WTO. See
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”), WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm
[https://perma.cc
/F2ZS-6343].
112 See Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, etc., WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm [https://
perma.cc/ZM9B-RXYX].
113 Aaron Flaaen & Justin Pierce, Disentangling the Effects of the 2018–2019
Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector, FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019086pap.pdf [https://perma.cc
/RA2T-3ENG].
114 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
115 Id.
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WTO obligations, which violates one of the most fundamental
principles of the WTO.116 This is the basic principle that prohibits
unilateralism.117 Only the WTO has the authority or jurisdiction
to decide issues of WTO law;118 all WTO members must defer to,
and base their actions on, the WTO’s determination of WTO law;119
if individual states could decide issues of WTO law on their own,
then these actions would undermine the WTO and the WTO would
become irrelevant.120
Section 301 deals with the issue of unilateralism by providing that upon the initiation of a 301 investigation, the United
States will file a parallel action in the dispute settlement system
of the WTO.121 The two actions will proceed simultaneously with
the United States’ action to be based on the result of the WTO
case.122 The issue of whether this mechanism was sufficient to
deal with the problem of unilateralism, was squarely raised by the
EU before the WTO panel in United States—Sections 301–310 of the
Trade Act of 1974.123 The EU argued that time deadlines under
Section 301 could require a decision by the United States on issues
116 See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of
1974, ¶¶ 2.2–3, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted on Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Trade Act of 1974], https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?file
name=Q:/WT/DS/152R.pdf&Open=True [https://perma.cc/H7NB-SGR9]].
117 This principle is contained in Article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, which provides in relevant part:
Members shall ... not make a determination to the effect that
a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered
agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance of the rules and procedures of
this Understanding, and shall make any such determination
consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate
Body report adopted by the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] or
an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding[.]
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 23.2(a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
WTO, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1241 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU]. For a discussion of the United States’ unilateralism, see United States
Unilateralism, supra note 34.
118 DSU, supra note 117, at 1241.
119 Id. at 1241–42.
120 See United States Unilateralism, supra note 34, at 30.
121 See id. at 12.
122 Id.
123 See Trade Act of 1974, supra note 116, ¶¶ 4.3, 7.112.

2021] UNDERSTANDING TRUMP’S CHINA TARIFFS

293

of WTO law before the WTO dispute settlement body could reach
its decision.124 The WTO panel rejected this argument because it
found that a U.S. administrative interpretation required the United
States to wait for a decision by the WTO before the Section 301
investigation could make any of its findings.125 Thus, Section 301
was not in violation of the principle prohibiting unilateralism
because any decisions of the United States on WTO law would
be based on a prior ruling by the WTO.126
Although the WTO provided clear direction on how Section
301 can be applied consistent with the WTO, the United States
has ignored this mandate in the U.S.-China trade war.127 For the
past twenty years, the United States brought a parallel case in
the WTO for every Section 301 investigation,128 but the Trump
Administration never filed a WTO case in the Section 301 investigations leading to the China tariffs.129 Instead, the United States
acted unilaterally and made findings under Section 301, including findings that implicated issues of WTO law, which were not
based on a prior WTO ruling.130 The United States then imposed
trade sanctions on China based upon such Section 301 findings.131
These sanctions are in breach of the WTO principle prohibiting
unilateralism and are without legal justification.132
C. Paralysis of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
U.S. defiance of the WTO can be understood only by considering the events set in place by the United States leading up
to December 10, 2019, when the WTO lurched into a crisis with the
paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body.133 U.S. dissatisfaction with
the WTO began almost immediately after the WTO’s inception on
Id. ¶¶ 4.1–3, 7.29.
Id. ¶¶7.112, 8.1.
126 Id. ¶ 8.1.
127 See id. ¶¶ 7.112, 8.1; United States Unilateralism, supra note 34, at 13.
128 See United States Unilateralism, supra note 34, at 12.
129 See id.
130 See Section 301 Investigation Fact Sheet, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2018
/june/section-301-investigation-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/7R7M-6Z8H].
131 See id.
132 See id; see DSU, supra note 117, art. 23.2(a).
133 See Daniel C.K. Chow, U.S. Trade Infallibility and the World Trade Organization, 2020 MICH. ST. L. REV. 599, 600–01 [hereinafter U.S. Trade Infallibility].
124
125
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January 1, 1995.134 The United States’ criticism of the WTO focuses
on three elements: (1) the “judicial activism” of the Appellate
Body that exceeds its powers and results in creating new law; (2)
WTO decisions that reject U.S. trade law remedies and require
repeal of venerable U.S. trade statutes; and (3) various violations by the Appellate Body of its own rules and procedures.135
Debate continues to rage over the role of the Appellate Body,
although most current attention focuses on how to resuscitate
the Appellate Body and save the WTO.136
The WTO decides cases through panels, which act as trial
courts, and the Appellate Body, which acts as the high court of
international trade.137 On May 12, 2016, President Barack Obama
took the unprecedented step of blocking new appointments to the
WTO Appellate Body to replace retiring panelists.138 The Trump
Administration continued this policy of U.S. intransigence with
the result that on December 10, 2019, the number of remaining active panelists fell below the number needed to constitute a quorum
in the Appellate Body.139 As a result, the Appellate Body was unable to convene and hear appeals of cases from WTO panels.140
Panel decisions that are not appealed are not affected by
the paralysis of the Appellate Body.141 Panel decisions that are
appealed, however, are launched into a legal limbo.142 The Appellate Body is unable to convene to hear the appeal and the rules
of the WTO make clear that once an appeal is filed, the WTO decision cannot take legal effect until the appeal is completed.143
Id. at 4.
Id. at 19–26.
136 Id. at 9–13.
137 Id. at 6.
138 Id. at 8.
139 Id.
140 What’s Next for the WTO?, COUNC. ON FOREIGN RELS. (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whats-next-wto [https://perma.cc/3NZX-2ZUP].
141 U.S. Trade Infallibility, supra note 133, at 8.
142 Id.
143 Article 16.4 of the DSU states in relevant part: “If a party has notified
its decision to appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered for
adoption by the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] until after completion of the
appeal.” DSU, supra note 117, art. 16.4. A panel or Appellate Body decision
becomes effective when it has been adopted by the DSB, which consists of the
entire membership of the WTO. See U.S. Trade Infallibility, supra note 133,
134
135
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As it is now impossible to complete the appeal, any decisions that
are appealed, are suspended indefinitely and have no legal effect.144
The most important consequence of the crippling of the
Appellate Body is that WTO obligations have become in effect
unenforceable.145 For example, suppose that China wishes to contest a U.S. tariff imposed in defiance of the WTO. If China wins
a decision against the United States from a WTO panel, the United
States can simply file an appeal and suspend the decision indefinitely, making it unenforceable.146
One month after the paralysis of the WTO, the United
States and China entered into the USCTA on January 15, 2020,
which completed the United States’ plan to seize power over dispute resolution, involving China, from the WTO.147 Under the
USCTA, the United States has created a parallel dispute resolution system, one that is under complete U.S. control and domination, which can be used by the United States to unilaterally
impose sanctions to resolve both USCTA and WTO obligations
involving China.148
at 6. Under the principle of reverse consensus, the DSB must adopt the decision unless a consensus of all members decide not to adopt it. Id. Thus, so
long as one member votes to adopt, the decision must be adopted. In practice,
this means that it is highly likely that all WTO panel or Appellate Body decisions will be adopted by the DSB. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at
84. However, adoption cannot occur so long as an appeal is still pending.
144 See U.S. Trade Infallibility, supra note 133, at 8.
145 Id. at 2–3.
146 See id. at 3.
147 See New & Controversial Approach, supra note 60, at 1–2.
148 Article 7.4 of the USCTA creates a unilateral dispute resolution mechanism that allows the United States to impose sanctions against China if
China fails to agree to U.S. trade demands under the USCTA and the WTO.
For a development of this argument, see New & Controversial Approach, supra note 60, at 1 (explaining that the United States had a three part strategy:
first, cripple the WTO dispute settlement system; second, engage in WTO
inconsistent behavior that can no longer be challenged by pressuring China
to purchase $200 billion in U.S. goods and services; and third, create a parallel dispute resolution system over USCTA and WTO disputes that are under
the USCTA which authorizes unilateral U.S. actions against China). Article
7.4 of the USCTA creates a unilateral dispute resolution mechanism that allows the United States to impose sanctions against China if China fails to
agree to U.S. trade demands under the USCTA and the WTO. See USCTA,
supra note 46, art. 7.4(1), (4)(b).
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D. The U.S. Power-Based Approach to International Trade
This discussion of the background to the U.S.-China trade
war illustrates the main strategic positions taken by the United
States as part of its power-based approach to international trade.
First, cripple the WTO dispute settlement system so that WTO
obligations become unenforceable.149 Second, impose unilateral
trade sanctions on U.S. trading partners in defiance of WTO law
that can no longer be challenged due to the paralysis of the Appellate Body.150 Third, create a parallel dispute settlement system in a bilateral treaty, which is under the complete control of
the United States.151 With this strategy in place, the United
States can use unilateral sanctions to pressure China and other
U.S. trading partners into making trade concessions and to reorder trading relationships with the United States, established
under prior U.S. administrations.152 While the United States
has been able to successfully create the legal conditions to allow
the United States to pursue its power-based approach, the next
part of this Article examines whether the power-based approach
has been able to achieve the economic and political results sought
by the United States.
II.ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE
U.S.-CHINA TRADE WAR
A. Power-Based Bargaining and Tariffs
Analysis of President Trump’s trade policy choices has typically interpreted them in terms of a zero-sum game, i.e., rather
than generating mutual benefits in a positive-sum game, international trade is a game where economically, one country is a
winner while the other must be a loser.153 However, trade economists Aaditya Mattoo and Robert Staiger offer an alternative
See New & Controversial Approach, supra note 60, at 1.
Id.
151 Id. These arguments are developed in U.S. Trade Infallibility, supra
note 133, at 14–26.
152 U.S. Trade Infallibility, supra note 133, at 27.
153 See Daniel C.K. Chow & Ian Sheldon, Is Strict Reciprocity Required for
Fair Trade?, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 33–38 (2019).
149
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explanation for these actions: the Trump administration has chosen to move from “rules-based” to “power-based” bargaining over
tariffs as a means of dealing with what they call “latecomers” to
the GATT/WTO.154 The concern here is that by switching from
rules-based to power-based bargaining, the United States is putting
the future of the post-war trading system at risk, as well as inflicting economic costs on both itself and its trading partners.155
Key to the functioning of the GATT/WTO has been the most
favored nation (MFN) principle and reciprocity, both acting as a
constraint on exercise of bargaining power by a powerful country
such as the United States.156 Specifically, MFN dilutes bargaining
power by ensuring that tariff commitments to either one country
or a subset of countries in the GATT/WTO are then offered to all
other countries in the GATT/WTO, and at the same time, reciprocity establishes the idea that there will be a balance of tariff
concessions in any negotiating round of the GATT/WTO.157 By
committing to such a set of rules, the United States has helped
induce other weaker/smaller countries to successively lower their
tariffs under the GATT/WTO.158
In 2017, the United States’ average MFN tariff was 3.4
percent compared to China’s average MFN tariff of 9.6 percent.159
Given this asymmetry in average bound tariffs, the current administration perceived that it had little left to offer a latecomer
to the WTO, such as China, in terms of reciprocity, and instead
it has resorted to unilaterally raising its tariffs as a means to
inducing China to cut its tariffs.160 However, in switching to unilateralism, the United States is following a “myopic logic”, i.e.,
See Mattoo & Staiger, supra note 55, at 1–2, 5.
See id. at 1.
156 See id. at 1–2. The Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle is enshrined
in GATT, Article I. GATT 1994, supra note 91, art. I. The MFN principle provides that any advantage given to any other country must be immediately
and unconditionally given to all GATT/WTO members. Id. For example, if the
United States gives the benefit of a low tariff to any country, the United States
must immediately and unconditionally extend the same low tariff to all WTO
members. The MFN universalizes trade benefits and is an inducement to join
the GATT/WTO. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 150.
157 See Mattoo & Staiger, supra note 55, at 2.
158 See id. at 8.
159 See Bown, supra note 28, at 30 tbl.4.
160 See United States Unilateralism, supra note 34, at 21.
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by using bargaining tariffs, the United States seems to have ignored the real possibility that other countries, such as China, would
likely resort to the same strategy, thereby undermining the multilateral trading system.161
U.S. strategy ignores the basic principles of game theory,
and the economic argument for why the GATT/WTO has, until
now, been largely successful in its promotion and governance of
international trade.162 The underlying logic of the GATT/WTO
has been explained by trade economists in terms of the resolution to a prisoner’s dilemma.163 Imagine a non-cooperative world
where the strategic choice of one country is to maximize its own
objective function through tariff policy, given the tariff policy of
the other country(ies). To understand its strategic choices, it is
important to think through the economic effects of a tariff and
why any country would rationally choose to apply one.164
Assuming exporters do not adjust their price, an import
tariff has the following effects: it raises the domestic price of the
good being imported, but it also generates tariff revenue on that
good.165 Once the transfer of revenue to the domestic exchequer
has been accounted for, the net effect of the tariff generates what
economists denote as a “deadweight loss,” i.e., there is a reduction in domestic consumers’ real income, with redistribution to
both import-competing firms and the government.166 In other
words, the incidence of the tariff is borne entirely by consumers
of the imported good, thereby reducing domestic economic welfare.167 The rationale for a country to follow a strategy that fails
to maximize national income can only be political, i.e., governments
adopt protectionist policies for electoral reasons.168 For example,
protectionist policies can be chosen to target either sector-specific
See id.
See Chow & Sheldon, supra note 153, at 4–5.
163 See generally Prisoner’s Dilemma, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://
seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/prisoner-dilemma/ [https://perma.cc/958Z-LPXW].
164 Mary Amiti et al., The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare,
33 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 187, 189–91 (2019).
165 Id. at 189.
166 See id. at 189–90.
167 See id.
168 See Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, A Protectionist Bias in
Majoritarian Politics, 120 Q.J. ECON. 1239, 1243 (2005).
161
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lobby groups who provide campaign contributions to political
parties or specific voter groups who are close to being indifferent
between candidates.169
However, if exporting firms do reduce their prices in response to the tariff, there will be a terms-of-trade benefit to the
importing country, captured in the form of additional tariff revenue.170 In this case, the incidence of the tariff is partially borne
by exporting firms, and it is quite possible for the terms-of-trade
gain to outweigh the deadweight loss of the tariff, domestic economic welfare increasing.171 The optimal import tariff, and hence
the extent of the terms-of-trade gain, will depend on the slope of
the export supply function, i.e., what economists define as the
price elasticity of supply, which measures the rate at which firms
change their supply in response to a change in prices.172
Essentially, the tariff game has the structure of a prisoner’s
dilemma: in the absence of cooperation, both countries, in choosing to maximize their payoffs, have a unilateral incentive to utilize a tariff, whatever the strategic choice of the other country.173
Each country seeks to improve its terms-of-trade, knowing that
the other country will rationally adopt that same strategy, the
outcome being a Nash equilibrium where neither country can
unilaterally change its tariff strategy and be better off.174 The
net result is that each country loses market access to the other
country’s market because of tariffs, the reduction in the volume
of international trade being economically inefficient.175
The latter result suggests that it would be Pareto-improving
for countries to agree to reduce their tariffs, and in the absence
of a binding bilateral agreement between countries, the GATT/WTO
See id. at 1239–41; Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection
for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833, 834 (1994) [hereinafter Protection for Sale].
170 See Amiti et. al, supra note 164, at 189.
171 See id.
172 See Christian Broda et al., Optimal Tariffs and Market Power, 98 AM.
ECON. REV. 2032, 2032–34 (2008).
173 See Ben Zissimos, The GATT and Gradualism, 71 J. INT’L ECON. 410,
415 (2007).
174 See id. at 413. The Nash Equilibrium, considered one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science, is named after Princeton University
mathematician John Nash. See Roger B. Myerson, Nash Equilibrium and the
History of Economic Theory, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1067, 1069–70 (1999).
175 See Zissimos, supra note 173, at 411.
169
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has essentially neutralized the terms-of-trade incentive for countries to raise tariffs.176 In other words, if terms-of-trade effects
have been removed from any country’s objective function, it will
set tariffs to satisfy domestic political objectives alone.177 These
would be either zero if a country seeks to maximize its national
income through free trade or they would be positive in order to
satisfy domestic political constraints, but, importantly, they are
lower than those in a non-cooperative game.178 Therefore, if
countries enter into a trade agreement, they will seek mutual reductions in tariffs generating an increase in national and global
economic welfare.
The lower tariff equilibrium under GATT/WTO has also
been supported by a credible enforcement mechanism embodied
in the dispute settlement process.179 Standard game theory suggests that countries would have an incentive to deviate from a lowtariff equilibrium.180 However, in a repeated game, the punishment
for not adhering to a trade agreement is reversion to the static
Nash equilibrium of high tariffs, i.e., what game theorists term a
trigger strategy.181 In practice, the rules of GATT/WTO seek to
maintain the balance of tariff concessions and avoid the use of
punitive, and therefore economically destructive, actions.182 Essentially, if one country were to raise its tariff, this would imply
a loss of previously negotiated market access for the foreign
country.183 Assuming that this action is not “abusive” under
GATT/WTO rules, the other country can withdraw an equivalent
amount of market access, a punishment path that is subgame
perfect.184 However, if a country deviates in an “abusive” manner,
there is reversion to the trigger strategy, i.e., there is an indefinite
suspension of GATT/WTO obligations, both countries setting Nash
See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, An Economic Theory of GATT,
89 AM. ECON. REV. 215, 226–27 (1999).
177 See id. at 222–23.
178 See id. at 222–24.
179 See Zissimos, supra note 173, at 426.
180 See id. at 411.
181 See id. at 413.
182 See ROBERT W. STAIGER, INTERNATIONAL RULES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR
TRADE POLICY 1501 (Gene M. Grossman & Kenneth Rogoff eds., 1995).
183 See Zissimos, supra note 173, at 416.
184 See id. at 412.
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equilibrium tariffs.185 In other words, the objective of GATT/WTO
rules is to ensure that retaliation by one country against the
unilateral action of another is proportionate, thereby minimizing
the chance of a trade war.186
By unilaterally raising tariffs to such an extent in 2018,
an action that was clearly “abusive,” the United States simply
provoked a trigger strategy reaction on the part of China.187 Instead of cutting its tariffs in response to the U.S. raising tariffs,
China (and other countries) retaliated in kind by raising tariffs
against the U.S., their average tariff reaching 18.3 percent by
2018,188 and while the two countries did halt escalation of the
trade war in early 2020 through Phase 1 of the USCTA, neither
side has actually reduced tariffs to their pre-2018 levels.189 Essentially, power-based bargaining by the U.S. has failed in the
sense that the bilateral relationship with China has been pushed
closer towards the higher tariff, non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, thereby putting the multilateral trading system at risk.190
B. The Economic Costs of Power-Based Bargaining
Given this substantive breach of the multilateral trading
system, it is logical to ask: at what cost? Essentially, the U.S.China trade war represents a natural experiment in the sense
that we have not seen such wide-ranging increases in tariffs
since the 1930s, when Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act.191 Not surprisingly, applied trade economists have already
conducted in-depth research on the impact of the trade war on
the U.S. economy, the most notable being those by Mary Amiti,
See id. at 416.
See id. at 427.
187 See Chad P. Bown, US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.piie.com/research
/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart [https://perma.cc/PW4S-FPX6].
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See Mattoo & Staiger, supra note 55, at 1.
191 See Chad P. Bown & Eva (Yiwen) Zhang, Trump’s 2019 Protection
Could Push China Back to Smoot-Hawley Tariff Levels, PETERSON INST. FOR
INT’L ECON. (May 14, 2019), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment
-policy-watch/trumps-2019-protection-could-push-china-back-smoot-hawley
[https://perma.cc/7M4B-WN5K].
185
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Stephen Redding, and David Weinstein; Alberto Cavallo et al.;
and Pablo Fajgelbaum et al.192
Of the studies cited, the latter is perhaps the most detailed. The authors constructed a monthly panel data set using
publicly available tariff schedules issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) along with U.S. import and
export data published by the U.S. Census Bureau, where the
tariff data are defined at the 8-digit level of the HTSUS, and the
import data are defined at the HTSUS-10-digit level.193 In addition, data on retaliatory tariffs were collected from the Ministry
of Finance for China, the Department of Finance of Canada, the
Office of the President of Mexico, and the WTO (covering the EU,
Russia, and Turkey), tariffs being measured by China at the 6digit level of the Harmonized Convention.194
During 2018, U.S. tariffs were targeted at 12,043 specific
products at the HTSUS-10-digit level, where in 2017, these imports were valued at $303 billion, accounting for 12.7 percent of
total U.S. imports.195 The average ad valorem tariff increased
from 2.6 to 16.6 percent.196 In terms of retaliatory tariffs on U.S.
exports by Canada, China, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, and the EU,
those accounted for $127 billion of U.S. exports, 8.2 percent of
total exports, covering 8,073 products.197
It is very clear from the data that the U.S. tariffs were
mostly targeted at China, and Chinese retaliatory tariffs against
the U.S. dominate, supporting the contention that the trade war
is essentially between these two countries.198 In 2018, the U.S.
targeted 11,207 products accounting for 49 percent of total imports from China, tariffs increased on average from 3.0 to 15.5
See Amiti et al., supra note 164, at 188; Fajgelbaum et al., supra note
48, at 1; see generally Alberto Cavallo et al., Tariff Passthrough at the Border
and at the Store: Evidence from US Trade Policy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 26396, 2019), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/CGNT_0
.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW2R-6WMP].
193 For a discussion of the Harmonized System, see supra text accompanying notes 90–111.
194 Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 7. This is due to HTSUS-8 codes
not being directly comparable across countries.
195 See id. at 8.
196 See id.
197 See id. at 8–9.
198 See id.
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percent; while China targeted 7,474 products, tariffs increased
on average from 8.4 to 18.9 percent.199 The data also show that
the most protected U.S. sectors were primary metals, machinery,
computer products, and electrical equipment and appliances, while
U.S. trading partners targeted different products, most notably
agricultural imports.200
Interestingly though, there was not much variation in tariff rate changes across sectors in either the United States or the
retaliating countries.201 Almost all U.S. imports were targeted
with either 10 or 25 percent tariff changes, and likewise for retaliatory tariff increases.202 This has two important implications:
first, if either side in the trade war were seeking to maximize termsof-trade effects, tariff changes would likely vary across sectors
depending on the price elasticity of supply;203 and, second, the
lack of variation in U.S. tariff increases point to them not being
driven by sector-specific lobbying.204
Given their monthly panel data set, Fajgelbaum et al. undertook a detailed empirical analysis of the effects of the trade war
on the U.S. economy.205 They conducted an “event” study which consisted of comparing targeted and non-targeted U.S. imports and
exports.206 In the case of imports, the results indicate their value
and quantity declined by 20 and 23 percent, respectively.207 Importantly, they also present initial evidence that the incidence of
U.S. import tariffs was borne entirely by U.S. consumers, tariffinclusive unit values of imports increased significantly as compared to before-tariff unit values which did not change.208 These
authors also found a similar pattern in the case of exports, where
their value and quantity fell by 24 and 25 percent, respectively,
See id. at 9.
See id. at 9–13.
201 See id. at 11–13.
202 See id.
203 See id. at 13. Formally, the less sensitive firms are to price changes, the
higher the optimal tariff.
204 See id. at 14.
205 See id. at 7, 52.
206 See id. at 14.
207 See id. at 15; see also Amiti et al., supra note 164, at 195. They find in
their analysis that the value of U.S. imports fell by 25 to 30 percent after imposition of the tariffs. Id.
208 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 15.
199
200
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with no change in their before-tariff unit values, i.e., there was complete passthrough of retaliatory tariffs to foreign consumers.209
Fajgelbaum et al. also used econometric methods to evaluate the impact of tariff increases on U.S. import demand and
foreign export supply.210 Their results, which are statistically
significant, show that both the value and quantity of U.S. imports
declined in response to the application of tariffs, Amiti, Redding,
and Weinstein found similar effects in their study.211 However,
Fajgelbaum et al. also found that there was no impact of U.S.
tariffs on before-tariff unit values.212 The latter result provides
further support for the argument that there was complete passthrough of the tariffs to tariff-inclusive prices borne by U.S. consumers.213 Similar results are reported for the impact of retaliatory
tariffs on U.S. exports—there were significant declines in both
the value and quantity of exports, but there was no reduction in
before-tariff unit values by U.S. exporters.214 By contrast, Cavallo
et al. (2019) found that there was imperfect passthrough of these
tariffs to Chinese import prices of agricultural products.215
The finding that incidence of U.S. tariffs was almost entirely borne by U.S. consumers is consistent with the results of other
studies using different estimation methodologies.216 It is also a
surprising result given the importance placed on the terms-oftrade argument in the international economic analysis of optimal
tariffs, as well as the empirical literature that has found less than
complete passthrough of exchange rate shocks.217 Over a longer
time period, it might be expected that exporters would eventually
cut before-tariff prices, especially if there was resolution of exporter uncertainty about how long the tariffs will remain in place.218
Interestingly, a follow-up study with additional data for 2019,
See id. at 16.
See id. at 25–26.
211 See id. at 26; Amiti et al., supra note 164, at 198–99.
212 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 26–27.
213 See id.
214 See id. at 31.
215 See Cavallo et al., supra note 192, at 29–30.
216 See Amiti et al., supra note 164, at 198–99; Cavallo et al., supra note
192, at 1.
217 See Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg et al., Goods Prices and Exchange
Rates: What Have We Learned?, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1243, 1244 (1997).
218 See Amiti et al., supra note 164, at 198.
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shows that there is some variation across sectors, e.g., U.S. tariffs
led foreign steel exporters to lower their before-tariff prices.219
The final step in the analysis of Fajgelbaum et al. was to
quantify the effects of the trade war in 2018 using a computable
general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy calibrated at the
county level.220 Their results were as follows: first, U.S. consumers
of imported goods in aggregate lost $51 billion due to higher prices;
second, U.S. exporters saw an increase in their income of $9.4
billion; and third, U.S. tariff revenue totaled $34.3 billion.221
Therefore, the net effect of the trade war was an aggregate loss
of U.S. real income of $7.2 billion, which can be thought of as an
approximation of the deadweight loss referred to earlier.222 The
latter number compares to Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein’s estimated net real income loss of $8.2 billion.223 As is often the case in
applied trade analysis, the net economic effects are relatively
small, but the re-distributional impact of tariffs on consumers is
substantial.224 Other research by Michael Waugh suggests that
subsequently this had a significant impact on consumption behavior, measured by reductions in county-level automobile sales.225
Importantly, contrary to what President Trump has claimed,
the results reported in Fajgelbaum et al., and in similar studies
clearly show that the incidence of import tariffs implemented in
2018 was entirely borne by U.S. consumers, any terms-of-trade
effects on the import side being insignificant.226 Also, if there
had been no retaliation by China and other countries, there
would have been a modest U.S. real income gain of $0.5 billion
in 2018 due to significant terms-of-trade effects on the export
See Mary Amiti et. al, Who’s Paying for the US Tariffs? A Longer-Term
Perspective 5 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26610, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26610/w26610.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AJ43-XPDT].
220 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 41.
221 Id. at 42–45.
222 Id. at 44–45.
223 Amiti et. al., supra note 164, at 199–200.
224 See Michael E. Waugh, The Consumption Response to Trade Shocks:
Evidence From the US-China Trade War, at 4 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 26353, 2019), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working
_papers/w26353/w26353.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q77B-RUXJ].
225 See id. at 2.
226 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 3.
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side.227 In other words, the logic of power-based bargaining only
ever had the potential to work if China had not adopted a trigger strategy in response to the increase in U.S. tariffs.228
As a precursor to later discussion of the estimated political
costs of the Administration’s adoption of power-based bargaining,
it is also worth summarizing Fajgelbaum et al.’s findings on the
U.S. regional economic effects of the trade war. As previously
noted, tariffs affect consumers through higher prices, but workers
in the protected import-competing sectors may also benefit from
higher producer and export prices.229 In addition, U.S. tariffs
were heavily targeted towards imports of intermediate inputs which
may be used more intensively in some regions compared to others.230 Any regional effects of U.S. import tariffs will also have
been affected by the regional structure of retaliatory tariffs.231
In order to analyze regional effects, Fajgelbaum et al. utilized annual industry employment and wage data at the county-bysector level for all nonfarm sectors, collected from the Census
Bureau County Business Patterns (CBP) database, while countylevel data for the farm sector were collected from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) Local Area Personal Income and Employment database.232 In addition, county-level demographic statistics were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau American
Community Survey, and county-level voting data were collected
from the U.S. Federal Election Commission.233
Several key results come out of the regional analysis.234
First, there is considerable variation across counties in their
Id. The argument here is as follows: when the U.S. imposes tariffs on a
range of products, U.S. consumers reallocate consumption to the U.S. versions of
these products. Id. at 42. The net effect is to raise world demand for the U.S.
version of the products relative to world demand for the Chinese version of
the products, resulting in a terms-of-trade benefit to U.S. producers. Id.
228 See id. at 4.
229 See id. at 45–49.
230 See Thiemo Fetzer & Carlo Schwarz, Tariffs and Politics: Evidence
from Trumps’ Trade Wars, at 1 (CEPR, Discussion Paper No. 13579, 2019).
The authors find that the geographic incidence of the 2018 tariffs correlated
with the Republican’s prior electoral performance. Id. at 7.
231 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 46–47.
232 Id. at 8.
233 See id.
234 See id. at 45–52.
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exposure to the trade war, with the Great Lakes region of the
Midwest and industrial areas of the Northeast receiving higher
tariff protection, while rural areas in the Midwestern plains and
Mountain West were subject to higher tariff retaliation.235 Second,
every county in the U.S. suffered a reduction in its real wage,
the counties with lower losses being in the Rust Belt and Southeast, while counties in the Midwestern Plains were hit with the
largest reductions in real wages due to the structure of retaliatory tariffs.236 Third, there is evidence that the Administration
targeted tariffs at politically competitive counties, with a view to
disproportionately affecting those voters important in determining electoral outcomes.237 Specifically, counties with a 40–60
percent Republican vote were targeted with higher tariffs than
counties that leaned heavily to either the Republicans or Democrats.238 In terms of economic impact, workers located in counties
where the Republican vote share was 85–95 percent incurred the
greatest cost due to the trade war.239 Reinforcing this, Waugh’s
analysis shows that the consumption impact of U.S. trade policy
varied regionally, with high-tariff counties experiencing larger
declines in automobile sales relative to low-tariff counties.240
C. The Impact of Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Agriculture
Given the recorded negative effect of the trade war on
counties in the Midwestern plains, and the importance of the rural
and farm sector to Donald Trump’s political base, it is important
to dig a little deeper into the extent to which the U.S. agricultural sector was disproportionately affected by retaliation to U.S. implementation of tariffs in 2018. The most detailed analysis of the
effect of this retaliation is provided by agricultural economists
Colin Carter and Sandro Steinbach.241 In their study, they used
See id. at 45–47.
See id. at 47–49.
237 See id. at 49.
238 See id. See also Protection for Sale, supra note 169, at 1239–40.
239 Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 51.
240 See Waugh, supra note 224, at 2.
241 See Colin A. Carter & Sandro Steinbach, The Impact of Retaliatory Tariffs on Agricultural and Food Trade, at 1–47 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 27147, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27147 [https://
perma.cc/EXU3-LAXB].
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a monthly panel dataset of tariffs targeted against U.S. products
at the HTSUS-8 and HTSUS-10-digit levels, collected from the
finance and trade ministries of Canada, China, the EU, India,
Mexico, Russia, and Turkey.242 These tariff data were matched with
U.S. export data from the Global Trade Atlas.243 The data indicate that average tariffs on U.S. agricultural products increased
from 8.3 to 28.6 percent on 908 products accounting for $32 billion worth of U.S. exports.244 Retaliatory tariffs disproportionately
affected agricultural products compared to other sectors, and the
tariff increases were also steeper, the average ad valorem tariff
increasing from 8.3 to 28.6 percent.245 Notably, the most significant retaliation was by China, who imposed tariffs on $25.5 billion of U.S. imports.246
In their empirical analysis, Carter and Steinbach also used
an “event” study to identify the impact of the retaliatory tariffs
on U.S. agricultural exports, based on exploiting differences in
export quantities, values, and unit values between targeted and
non-targeted products over time.247 Their reported results indicate that retaliatory tariffs had a significant impact on agricultural
trade.248 First, the United States saw a 55 percent reduction in its
exports to retaliating countries worth -$15.6 billion (trade destruction), which was only partially offset by a 0.8 percent increase in
exports worth $1.2 billion to countries that did not implement
tariffs (trade deflection), i.e., net destruction of U.S. agricultural
exports was -$14.4 billion.249 Second, non-retaliating countries
experienced a 31 percent expansion of their exports to retaliating
countries worth $13.5 billion (trade diversion).250 These effects were
also very concentrated at the product level, with trade destruction
and trade diversion being particularly significant for soybeans
at -$7.1 billion and $3.7 billion, respectively, and trade in pork
products and coarse grains such as corn also being affected.251
See id. at 7.
See id.
244 Id. at 1.
245 Id. at 8.
246 Id.
247 See id. at 9.
248 See id. at 11.
249 Id. at 16.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 17.
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Overall, U.S. exporters appeared to have had difficulty in adapting their supply chains to non-retaliating countries, while other
exporting countries were able to increase their market share in
retaliating countries at the expense of the U.S.252
Sheldon and Grant253 have shown China had a significant
impact on the extent of agricultural trade destruction and diversion.254 In their empirical analysis, a comparison is made between
the monthly values of combined exports to China by the EU28,
Brazil and Argentina, and Australia and New Zealand, to the
monthly value of U.S. exports to China for the 2016/17 and
2018/19 agricultural marketing years (September–August).255
While trade diversion to these countries was not a one-to-one
displacement of what is normally the U.S.’s peak export marketing period, the data show clearly the shift in sourcing of China’s
imports as the trade war escalated.256 In January 2019, China
imported 2.6 times ($7.1 billion total) more from these competing
suppliers as compared to January 2017.257 Trade destruction,
measured by the loss of U.S. market share in China, was particularly significant for U.S. exports of soybeans, the value of which
fell from $12.2 to $4.5 billion over the period 2017–19.258 Brazil
benefited the most from trade diversion, soybean exports to China
initially increasing from $20.3 billion in 2017 to $27.3 billion in
2018, before falling back in 2019 to $20.5 billion following China’s
outbreak of African Swine Fever in late 2018.259
As already discussed, tariff increases by a large country
such as China usually depress world prices, resulting in a transfer from exporting to importing country(ies).260 This was certainly
the case with China’s retaliatory tariff of 25 percent imposed on
imports of U.S. soybeans, and it is hard to over-emphasize the
See id.
IAN M. SHELDON & JASON GRANT, CAST COMMENTARY, GLOBAL TRADE
IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS THE LIKELY IMPACT OF COVID-19, at 7 (2020), https://
aede.osu.edu/sites/aede/files/imce/images/QTA2020-3-COVID-Impacts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PZT8-9CTK].
254 See id. at 5–9.
255 See id. at 7.
256 See id.
257 Id. at 8.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 See supra notes 103–12 and accompanying text.
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economic and political importance of soybean production and exports to the U.S. agricultural sector.261 Prior to the start of the
trade war, the United States exported $23.8 billion worth of soybeans, two and a half times greater than its exports of corn.262
Under normal trading conditions, the United States would export
approximately 50 percent of the soybeans it produced, with over
half of those exports going to China, e.g., in the 2016/17 marketing year, the United States exported 36 million metric tons (MMT)
of soybeans to China, 61 percent of total soybean exports—about
one in three rows of harvested soybeans.263 Compared to average
soybean exports to China of 31 MMT over the three marketing
years prior to 2018/19, U.S. exports fell by 65 percent after implementation of the tariff.264 Given the modest increase in U.S.
soybean exports to other countries such as Argentina, the EU, and
Egypt, U.S. soybean exports fell overall by 10.4 MMT in 2018/19.265
Combined with a strong harvest in 2018 and the loss of
market share to Brazil, the United States saw a significant decline in cash prices received by U.S. soybean farmers in the
2018/19 marketing year.266 In many parts of the agricultural
producing regions of the United States, there was a weakening
of the “basis”, i.e., the difference between what farmers are paid
at their local elevator and the nearest futures price listed on the
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).267 The basis is a function of
multiple factors, including, yields at harvest, transport costs,
crop quality, seasonality, and the extent and cost of storage.268
Given that the Chinese tariff displaced a significant proportion
of U.S. soybean exports, this put downward pressure on the cash
prices offered by the major commodity handling firms, which resulted in weakening of the basis.269 By the beginning of September
Michael K. Adjemian et al., Tariff Retaliation Weakened the U.S. Soybean
Basis, 34 CHOICES 1 (2019), https://www.choicesmagazine.org/UserFiles/file
/cmsarticle_722.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ABD-8S9G].
262 Id. at 1.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 See id.
267 See id. at 2.
268 See id.
269 See id.
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2018, U.S. soybean producers were being quoted an average cash
price of 95 cents/bushel below the futures contract for delivery
that November, 30 cents/bushel lower than the previous year.270
In addition, with exports to China from U.S. ports on the
Pacific coast falling by 94 percent in the second half of 2018,
there was a significant spatial effect on cash prices received by
soybean farmers in the upper Midwest, a region that lacks soybean crushing capacity and experiences high transport costs to
alternative ports on the Gulf.271 In addition, farm financial constraints and a lack of on-farm storage forced many farmers to sell
their soybean crop at lower cash prices.272 For example, by the end
of September 2018, the average cash price of soybeans in North
Dakota was over $2/bushel below the November futures price, a
dollar less than the price offered the year before.273 This confirms
the empirical findings of Cavallo et al. reported earlier that there
was imperfect passthrough of tariffs to Chinese import prices for
agricultural commodities, i.e., U.S. soybean farmers bore a significant incidence of these tariffs.274
D. U.S. Agriculture and the U.S.-China Trade Agreement
Due to its political influence in the U.S., it is not surprising that agriculture was a critical component of Phase I of the
USCTA that went into effect on January 14, 2020.275 Specifically,
China committed to purchasing an additional $12.5 and $19.5
billion worth of U.S. agricultural products above 2017 levels in
2020 and 2021, respectively, implying total agricultural imports
of $36.5 billion in 2020 and $43.5 billion in 2021.276 Essentially,
these commitments by China constitute a voluntary import expansion (VIE), harking back to the era of managed trade between the United States and Japan in the 1980s.277
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
272 See id.
273 Id.
274 See Cavallo et al., supra note 192, at 29–30.
275 See USCTA, supra note 46.
276 See id., art. 6.2(1)(b).
277 See Chad P. Bown & Soumaya Keynes, Why Trump Shot the Sheriffs:
The End of WTO Dispute Settlement 1.0 5 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ.,
270
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As a trade policy instrument, VIEs have rarely been used
by policymakers and are not even covered by typical undergraduate textbooks in international economics.278 In principle, a Chinese
agricultural VIE would work as follows: the targeted level of imports results in China’s import demand curve shifting out, driving up the price received by U.S. exporters, and at the same
time, driving down the internal Chinese price, in order that its
market can clear.279 In other words, in the absence of an import
subsidy from the Chinese government, agricultural commodity
traders operating in China will incur a loss as they will have to
sell the mandated extra imports at a loss.280 Part of this loss is
transferred to Chinese consumers who benefit from lower prices,
and part is transferred to U.S. exporters in the form of higher
prices, the remainder being the deadweight loss due to inefficient U.S. production and Chinese consumption.281
In research reported by Robert Feenstra and Chang Hong,
it has been calculated that, depending on a range of forecasts for
Chinese economic growth, the gap between prices paid to U.S.
exporters at the Chinese border and the price importers can charge
Chinese consumers would require import subsidies paid by the
Chinese government in the range 12–23 percent for 2020, and 42–
59 percent in 2021, in order that Chinese commodity traders could
break even.282 This would represent a significant distortion to
international agricultural commodity markets, with trade diversion
to U.S. exporters away from other exporting countries, including
Australia, Brazil, and Canada.283
Working Paper No. 20-4, 2020), https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents
/wp20-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2ZQ-VXUD].
278 See Steven M. Suranovic, Voluntary Import Expansions (VIEs), Ch. 10-6,
INT’L TRADE THEORY AND POL’Y (2007), http://internationalecon.com/Trade
/Tch10/T10-6.php [https://perma.cc/F9HU-8BNK].
279 See Steven M. Suranovic, Price Effects of a Voluntary Import Expansion
(VIE) / Import Subsidy: Large Country Case, Ch. 90-30, INT’L TRADE THEORY
AND POL’Y (2007), http://internationalecon.com/Trade/Tch90/T90-30.php [https://
perma.cc/W5EQ-LUBG].
280 See id.
281 See id.
282 See Robert Feenstra & Chang Hong, China’s Import Demand for Agricultural Products: The Impact of the Phase One Trade Agreement 1–2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27383, 2020), https://www.nber.org
/papers/w27383 [https://perma.cc/6LXN-9CWY].
283 See id. at 3.
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Of course, these are implicit import subsidies, the only realistic way for China to meet their agricultural import commitments being through mandates to SOEs such as the China Oil
and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO).284 However, as a practical
matter, two interdependent factors militate against relying on
SOEs to satisfy the import targets. First, private trading firms
are mostly responsible for purchasing Chinese agricultural imports, for example, in 2015, accounting for 72, 69, and 92 percent
of Chinese imports of soybeans, cotton, and meat products, respectively.285 Second, despite the USCTA, China has not reduced
its retaliatory tariffs against U.S. imports, therefore, private trading
firms will have an incentive to purchase commodities from the
world market at lower prices, thereby undermining the VIE.286
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, many observers
suggested that meeting such agricultural import growth targets
would be difficult.287 Based on China’s growth rate prior to the
pandemic, it has been predicted that by 2021, there will be a
shortfall of $10.5 billion in imports from the United States relative to the target, and based on a declining trend projection, the
shortfall will be even larger at $23.6 billion.288 This expected
shortfall has already been borne out in the January–May 2020
China Customs Statistics.289 While improving on 2019 totals at
284 See Chad P. Bown & Mary E. Lovely, Trump’s Phase One Deal Relies on
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Mar. 3,
2020), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps
-phase-one-deal-relies-chinas-state-owned-enterprises
[https://perma.cc
/KD2V-8MBC].
285 See id.
286 See id.; Chad P. Bown, Phase One China Deal: Steep Tariffs Are the New
Normal, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.piie
.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/phase-one-china-deal-steep-tar
iffs-are-new-normal [https://perma.cc/Y2QJ-8YMJ].
287 See America and China Reach a “Phase One” Trade Deal, THE ECONOMIST
(Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/12/14
/america-and-china-reach-a-phase-one-trade-deal [https://perma.cc/H7GR-QRBF].
288 See Chad P. Bown, Unappreciated Hazards of the U.S.-China Phase
One Deal, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.piie.com
/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/unappreciated-hazards-us-china-phase
-one-deal [https://perma.cc/SG8B-F6G9].
289 See Chad P. Bown, U.S.-China Phase One Tracker: China’s Purchases
of U.S. Goods, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (July 2, 2020), https://www
.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-phase-one-tracker-chinas-purchases-us
-goods [https://perma.cc/PM6W-9AU9].
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the height of the trade war, 2020 January–May totals of $7.5 billion
suggest Chinese agricultural imports from the United States are
running at 50 percent below the Agreement’s year-to-date target.290
In light of the COVID-19 pandemic shock to the global economy,
the WTO’s forecast for China’s real GDP growth in 2020 of -4.0 to 9.9 percent291 makes it seem very unlikely China will meet its
import commitments under the USCTA, and even if it were able
to do so, it would imply significant distortion to agricultural trade.
E. Domestic Political Effects of the U.S.-China Trade War
1. Trade Liberalization and Economic Nationalism
In evaluating the impact of the U.S.-China trade war on
U.S. political outcomes, it is important to understand how Chinese import penetration prior to the financial crisis was a factor
in pushing U.S. politics towards overt economic nationalism.292
Trade liberalization in the post-war period has created both winners
and losers in the United States, i.e., consumers and resources employed in the export-competing sectors have gained while resources
such as less-skilled labor employed in the import-competing sectors have suffered the costs of job displacement and reduced incomes.293 From the perspective of cost-benefit analysis, it is
straightforward to demonstrate the gains from trade by appealing to the so-called Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle. Specifically, as long as benefits of trade liberalization outweigh the
losses, in principle it is possible for the winners to compensate
the losers and still be better off, in other words, there is the potential for a Pareto improvement whereby some agents in the
U.S. economy are made better off without the remaining agents
being made any worse off.294
See id.
See Eddy Bekkers et al., Methodology for the WTO Trade Forecast of
April 8, 2020, tbl. 5, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/method
pr855_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/829M-S5KS].
292 See Steve McCorriston & Ian M. Sheldon, Economic Nationalism: U.S.
Trade Policy vs. Brexit, 14 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 64, 65–70 (2020).
293 See Dani Rodrik, Populism and the Economics of Globalization, 1 J.
INT’L BUS. POL’Y 12, 17–18 (2018); Pol Antràs et al., Globalization, Inequality
and Welfare, 108 J. INT’L ECONS. 387, 387–412 (2017).
294 See Antràs et al., supra note 293, at 388.
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The obvious problem with this principle is highlighted when
compensation of losers is either insufficient or does not actually
occur.295 This creates the potential for populism to gain ground,
the political outcome being economic nationalism, that is, opposition to free trade and increased isolationism, and a strong nationalist stance.296 As redistribution policies have either become less
feasible or more costly, the mechanism for compensating losers from
trade liberalization switches to protectionism.297 This also gets
wrapped up in a political narrative of authoritarian nationalism
drawing on populist grievances.298
Populism can be defined as a political movement that involves
a combination, but not necessarily all, of anti-elitism, authoritarianism and nativism, as well as opposition to trade liberalization.299
A key to populism is that society is seen as being divided into
two groups: the people and the elite, the latter controlling government, business and the financial sector, who are perceived as
not acting in the best interests of the people.300 This idea was
clearly captured in speeches made by Donald Trump both before
and after his election as U.S. president.301 Populists believe that
only they represent the “true people,” and as a consequence some
set of voting citizens can be convinced to reject the “moral legitimacy” of the elite.302
Trade economists Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman
argue that populism is a specific form of “identity politics,” such
See Italo Colantone & Piero Stanig, The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe, 62
AM. J. POL. SCI. 936, 937–38 (2018).
296 See id.
297 See id.
298 See id.
299 BARRY EICHENGREEN, THE POPULIST TEMPTATION: ECONOMIC GRIEVANCE
AND POLITICAL REACTION IN THE MODERN ERA 1 (2018); see Rodrik, supra note
293, at 16.
300 EICHENGREEN, supra note 299, at 1.
301 Alexandra Homolar & Ronny Scholz, The Power of Trump-Speak: Populist Crisis Narratives and Ontological Security, 32 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFFS.
344, 344–60 (2019); see George Packer, The Left Needs a Language Potent Enough
to Counter Trump, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.theatlantic
.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/language-trump-era/595570/ [https://perma.cc
/85HB-GUKQ].
302 See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 2–4 (2016).
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that voters’ preferences over trade policy reflect both their economic
self-interest as well as their concerns for the groups in society
with whom they identify.303 The authors then posit a “populist
revolution” driven by a significant external event such as the
China import shock to the U.S. economy, which widens the income
distribution.304 As a result, less-skilled workers reject the legitimacy of the elites and, instead, see the nation as synonymous with
their type.305 From this, they show how a dramatic rise in populism could lead to a substantive shift in a country’s trade policy
towards protectionism.306 The political-economic outcome is one
where a political party running on a populist platform implements a discrete jump in tariffs imposed on imported goods.307
There is now a growing body of research examining the
impact of the China import shock on U.S. employment and other
metrics.308 For example, Justin Pierce and David Schott have
shown that U.S. extension of permanent normal trade relations
(PNTR) to China in 2000 in anticipation of China’s entry into the
GATT/WTO in 2001 was associated with a sharp drop in U.S.
manufacturing employment between 2000 and 2003, the effect
being stronger in industries most affected by a reduction in uncertainty about tariff rates.309 Other researchers have found a link
between the China import shock and a wider range of economic
and social issues, including crime rates,310 increases in household
303 See Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Identity Politics and
Trade Policy 1–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25348,
2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25348/w25348.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4D2R-J5R8].
304 See id. at 28.
305 See id. at 17.
306 See id. at 28.
307 See id. at 17–20.
308 See Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott, The Costs of U.S. Trade Liberalisation with China Have Been Acute for Some Workers, at 13–17, in MEREDITH A.
CROWLEY, TRADE WAR: THE CLASH OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ENDANGERING GLOBAL
PROSPERITY (2019) (ebook), https://voxeu.org/content/trade-war-clash-economic
-systems-threatening-global-prosperity [https://perma.cc/93FJ-X74D].
309 See Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott, The Surprisingly Swift Decline
of US Manufacturing Employment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 1632, 1632–35 (2016).
310 See Yi Che & Xun Xu, The China Syndrome in US: Import Competition,
Crime, and Government Transfer 1–4 (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Working
Paper No. 68135, 2015), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68135/2/MPRA_paper
_68135.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP39-M4NV].
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debt,311 declines in marriage rates,312 and increased death from
drug overdoses.313
Probably the most significant insights into the domestic
consequences of the China “shock” are associated with David Autor
and colleagues in a series of articles.314 Their work on the U.S.
measures the geographic exposure of labor markets across the
United States to the increase in imports from China.315 The
“shock” feature of Chinese imports relates to the rapid rise primarily in manufacturing imports from China up to 2007.316 The
rising international competitiveness of China has been associated
with increased openness in China that allowed Western firms to
outsource production activities to China, the relaxation of central planning, the accession to the WTO in 2001, and the possible manipulation of their exchange rate.317 Not only has the rise
in China’s competitiveness given rise to concerns about “unfair”
trade, but the extent and speed of the rise in imports from China
forced considerable adjustment in the United States with the
resulting impact on regional labor markets where manufacturing activities are located.318
Due to labor immobility in the U.S., the impact of Chinese
imports was particularly strong across certain U.S. states: wages
311 See Jean-Noël Barrot et al., Import Competition and Household Debt,
Staff Report No. 821, at 1–4 (2017), FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., https://www.new
yorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr821.pdf [https://perma
.cc/CH6C-P8UT].
312 See David H. Autor et al., When Work Disappears: Manufacturing Decline and the Falling Marriage-Market Value of Young Men (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 23173, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/work
ing_papers/w23173/w23173.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YL9-FHJ4].
313 See Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott, Trade Liberalization and Mortality: Evidence from U.S. Counties 1–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 22849, 2016), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22
849/w22849.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE46-TJ4H].
314 See David H. Autor et al., The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market
Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 205, 206–07 (2016)
[hereinafter Autor et al., China Shock]; David H. Autor et al., The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103
AM. ECON. REV. 2121, 2121–22 (2013) [hereinafter Autor et al., China Syndrome].
315 Autor et al., China Syndrome, supra note 314, at 2122–23.
316 Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 314, at 209–14.
317 See id. at 209–15.
318 See Autor et al., China Syndrome, supra note 314, at 2136–39.
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fell dramatically, women withdrew from the workforce, there was
an increase in demand for social benefits and disability allowances, and when workers were re-engaged in the same locality,
rehiring was at wages much lower than previous employment.319
This was the main feature of the China import shock: the geography was felt dramatically in several, typically southern and
eastern, states, whereas other states escaped the impact of the
rise of China given the differences in industrial structure.320 In
sum, looking beyond the aggregate of “national” welfare, the rapid
growth of China had a significant impact on certain parts of the
United States.321
How did the China “shock” affect polarization of U.S. voting patterns? Autor et al. address this issue by extending their
analysis of the China “shock” to an examination of voting patterns across the United States.322 Using detailed data on voting
in congressional and presidential elections, they report two main
results. First, while accounting for other determinants of voting
patterns, for example, education, age, white collar et cetera, due
to the dramatic rise in imports from China, voters were less likely
to support moderate candidates of either main political party.323
There was a swing to either end of the political spectrum reflecting an increase in polarization in the U.S. political environment.324 Second, in presidential elections, in the districts most
exposed to competition from Chinese imports, there was an increase in support for Republican candidates.325 Although there
may be other factors that have contributed to the divisiveness of
U.S. politics in recent years, these authors have established a
See id. at 2137, 2158–61.
See id. at 2158–60.
321 See id. at 2158–59.
322 See David Autor et al., Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral
Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 22637, 2017) [hereinafter Autor et al., Importing Political
Polarization], https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22637/w22
637.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JFC-S8HQ]; see also Yi Che et al., Does Trade Liberalization with China Influence U.S. Elections?, at 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 22178, 2016), https://www.nber.org/system/files
/working_papers/w22178/w22178.pdf [https://perma.cc/79ZT-CXCL].
323 See Autor et al., Importing Political Polarization, supra note 322, at 1–2.
324 See id. at 1–5.
325 See id. at 1–6.
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clear link between trade liberalization and political outcomes, which
ties closely with the “America First” slogan and the targeting of
tariffs by President Trump.326 As Autor et al. point out, both
presidential candidates in 2016 explicitly highlighted competition from China in their electoral campaigns, the results here
suggesting that the competition from China favored the Republican candidate.327
2. The Trade War and U.S. Voting Behavior
As described in a series of articles by Chad Bown and coauthors, the Administration’s approach to trade policy has also
been driven by: first, a broad range of technical and legal concerns about Chinese industrial policy, including the role of SOEs
and subsidies, theft of intellectual property, and forcible acquisition of technology;328 second, the inability of GATT/WTO rules to
effectively address such policy concerns, especially China’s use of
subsidies;329 and, third, broader concerns about the WTO dispute
settlement system, notably perceived judicial overreach by the
Appellate Body.330
However, given President Trump’s anti-China rhetoric and
the outcome of the 2016 election, it is not surprising that his administration chose to follow a strategy of power-based bargaining in
the form of higher tariffs against China, as opposed to seeking a
broad coalition with other countries to pursue a case against
China at the WTO.331 The previous discussion of the evidence
See Che et al., supra note 322, at 18.
See id. at 43.
328 See Bown, supra note 28, at 20.
329 See Chad P. Bown & Jennifer A. Hillman, WTOing a Resolution to the
China Subsidy Problem, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 557, 558–59 (2019).
330 See Bown & Keynes, supra note 277, at 11–13; USTR POLICY AGENDA &
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 27–28. See also infra text accompanying
note 331.
331 See The Best Way to Address China’s Unfair Policies and Practices Is
Through a Big, Bold Multilateral Case at the WTO: Hearing on U.S. Tools to
Address Chinese Market Distortions Before the U.S.-China Econ. and Rev.
Sec. Comm’n, 115th Cong. 1–2 (2018) (statement of Jennifer Hillman, Professor, Geo. Univ. L. Ctr.), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Hillman%20
Testimony%20US%20China%20Comm%20w%20Appendix%20A.pdf?mod=ar
ticle_inline [https://perma.cc/GJ6N-HLP4]; see also Robert Z. Lawrence, How
the United States Should Confront China Without Threatening the Global Trading
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presented in Fajgelbaum et al. suggests that tariffs were targeted
for maximum electoral impact,332 which leads to a natural question:
did the trade war affect the outcome of the 2018 midterm elections?
The available empirical evidence suggests the answer to
this question is that it did.333 The most detailed analysis has
been conducted by economists Emily Blanchard, Chad Bown,
and Davin Chor.334 The focus of their statistical analysis is on
the relationship between U.S. voting patterns and county-level
policy exposure, the latter being measured by the extent to which
counties were protected by tariffs on U.S. imports, the extent to
which they were affected by retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports,
and the degree to which they stood to gain from subsidies extended to farmers under the 2018 Market Facilitation Program
(MFP).335 The latter policy was put in place in response to tariffs
placed on U.S. agricultural exports.336 In addition, their analysis
also controls for the extent to which local health insurance coverage was at risk from repeal of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).337
Using data from David Leip’s U.S. Election Atlas, the authors constructed a dependent variable measuring the county-level
vote share received by Republican candidates for each of the
2012–2018 elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, plus
the 2016 Presidential election.338 The voting pattern variable is
then related to a series of independent variables:
(1) Import tariff shocks were defined as a county’s average
per-worker exposure to increased U.S. tariffs, measured at the
HTSUS 8 digit level, and the retaliatory tariff shock was defined
as per-worker exposure to retaliatory tariffs by Canada, China,
the EU, and Mexico.339 These tariff increases were combined
with initial bilateral trade volumes by industry and country,
System, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 6 (2018), https://www.piie.com/sys
tem/files/documents/pb18-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/S63P-2XPU].
332 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 49–52.
333 See Emily J. Blanchard et al., Did Trump’s Trade War Impact the 2018
Election? 1–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26434, 2019),
https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/wp19-21.pdf [https://perma
.cc/N6E7-PBHU].
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335 See id. at 2.
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which were then mapped into a measure of a county’s share of
national employment in a specific industry using the 2016
U.S. County Business Patterns.340
(2) Given MFP, which in 2018 consisted of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) administering the payment of
$12 billion in subsidies to producers of soybeans, sorghum,
corn, wheat and some other commodities, a variable was constructed to measure the total farm subsidy received by a
county weighted by its working age population.341
(3) Two county-level healthcare variables were constructed
based on the U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey, one measuring the share of the population having health
insurance just prior to the 2018 mid-term election, and a second measuring the change in the share of those having health
insurance since ACA came into effect in 2010.342
(4) A set of county-level demographic (age, gender, and race)
and socioeconomic (employment shares, unemployment rate,
mean income, education) control variables were used, drawing
on the U.S. Census, the County Business Patterns dataset,
and the U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey.343

The key econometric result reported in this study was
that greater local exposure to the economic impact of the trade
war was associated with a decline in support and loss of seats in
the House of Representatives for Republican candidates in the
2018 midterm elections.344 Importantly, this result was mostly a
function of the extent to which a county was affected by the retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports, especially to China,
most notably in counties where Trump had narrowly lost the
popular vote in the 2016 Presidential election.345 The agricultural
subsidies offered by the MFP partially offset the decline in Republican vote share, but due to the concentrated set of counties
where these were targeted, they had no significant effect on the
swing in seats.346 In addition, the results were statistically robust to inclusion of healthcare variables.347
See id. at 20–21. The trade data come from the World Bank WITS database.
Blanchard et al., supra note 333, at 22. The MFP subsidy rates are
drawn from the Congressional Research Service, while county-level commodity
production comes from USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS).
342 See Blanchard et al., supra note 333, at 8–9.
343 See id. at 9.
344 See id. at 18.
345 See id. at 18.
346 See id.
347 Id.
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The political impact of retaliatory tariffs against U.S. agricultural exports, particularly soybeans, also shows up in the
research of political scientists Olga Chyzh and Robert Urbatsch.348
In their empirical analysis, they analyzed the impact of a county’s reliance on soybean production on the change in the Republican vote share in the 2016 and 2018 elections to the House of
Representatives.349 The latter variable was constructed as an
odds ratio of Republican-to-Democrat county-level votes between
the two elections, based on data collected from Secretaries of
State or equivalents,350 while the former variable was measured
in both soybean bushels and value of soybean sales, using 2012
data from USDA.351 In addition, other control variables included
county-level GDP per capita, unemployment, education, urbanization, ethnicity, and percent of population who voted for Donald
Trump in the 2016 Presidential election.352 The latter data were
drawn from the BEA and U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey, and the Cook Political Report’s Partisan Voting
Index.353 The key econometric result of this study is that there
was a direct negative relationship between a county’s economic
reliance on soybean production and the decrease in Republican
vote share between 2016 and 2018.354
This empirical research adds another dimension to the
argument that the Trump Administration’s choice of power-based
bargaining over trade policy was rather short-sighted, generating
a whole sequence of unintended consequences. Not only has the
resulting trade war inflicted economic damage on the U.S. economy, but at the local level the economic damage has also resulted
in political damage to the incumbent political party.355 Notwithstanding the fact that the China import shock resulted in greater
See Olga Chyzh & Robert B. Urbatsch, Bean Counters: The Effect of Soy
Tariffs on Change in Republican Vote Share Between the 2016 and 2018 Elections, at 1–16 (Digital Repository Iowa State University, 2019), https://lib
.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=pols_pubs. [https://
perma.cc/CQ5S-7NEZ].
349 See id. at 2.
350 See id. at 4–5.
351 See id. at 6–7.
352 See id. at 7–8.
353 See id. at 7–8.
354 See id. at 10.
355 See id.
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political polarization in the United States, and concomitant support for nationalist and protectionist trade policies, the use of
tariffs by the Administration appears to have backfired.356 Importantly, retaliating countries such as China, in specifically
targeting U.S. agricultural exports, seem to have neutralized any
potential political benefits from protecting some sectors of the
U.S. economy.357
In this context, it is not surprising that President Trump
has placed so much public emphasis on the Phase I of USCTA,
and China’s commitment to substantially increasing their agricultural imports from the United States in 2020 and 2021.358
However, the potential for extensive trade diversion due to the
USCTA runs the risk of negatively affected exporting countries
such as Brazil filing a complaint at the WTO.359 In addition, the
subsidies targeted at U.S. farmers through the MFP program,
designed to cushion them from the effects of retaliatory tariffs, could
find the United States being in breach of the WTO’s Agreement
on Agriculture (AoA).360 Under the AoA, the United States has
committed to not spending more than $19.1 billion per year on
trade-distorting farm subsidies, but analysis by the Environmental
Working Group (EWG) indicates federal farm payments for the
2018/19 crop year will reach $34 billion, 78 percent above the
cap, with payments in the 2019/20 crop year also likely to exceed
the cap.361 Australia, Brazil, Canada, the EU, and New Zealand
have already complained that U.S. farm subsidies are in breach
of the AoA.362 With the crippling of the WTO dispute settlement
See id.
See Fetzer & Schwarz, supra note 230, at 5–6. These authors present
empirical evidence that targeted retaliation by China and other countries has been
effective, Republican candidates faring worse in the 2018 midterm elections.
358 See id. at 6–7.
359 See id.
360 See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the WTO, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410.
361 See Jared Hayes, Farm Bailout Payments Could Ignite New Front in
Trade War, ENV’T WORKING GRP.: AGMAG (June 17, 2020), https://www.ewg
.org/agmag/2020/06/farm-bailout-payments-could-ignite-new-front-trade-war
[https://perma.cc/J6CN-CZ8J]
362 See Mike Dorning, Trump Farm Bailouts Raise Risks of Reprisals from
Trade Partners, BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2020-06-18/trump-farm-bailouts-raise-risks-of-reprisals-from-trade
-partners [https://perma.cc/4ZU5-LYT7].
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system, there is a very real risk that members such as the EU
will unilaterally retaliate with tit-for-tat farm subsidies, creating a
new front in the trade war.363
CONCLUSION
The United States’ power-based approach to trade has
achieved some notable successes in the legal arena of international trade.364 The United States was able to decommission the
WTO Appellate Body and to immunize itself from legal challenges to its acts in defiance of WTO law.365 These actions create
the legal conditions for the use by the United States of a unilateral approach to trade.366 In the area of economics and politics,
however, the U.S. power-based approach has achieved mixed results, due to the unpredictable and uncertain variables involved
in these areas.367
This study indicates that the U.S. power-based approach
to China has led to some negative economic and political effects
on the United States. In particular, contrary to the assertion by
the Trump Administration, the empirical evidence indicates unequivocally that tariffs imposed on China are not paid for by
China but constitute a tax on U.S. consumers in the amount of
$51 billion and a net loss of $7.3 billion to the U.S. economy.368
This evidence suggests that the most effective use of a power-based
approach may be against countries that lack the political will or
economic power to engage the United States in a prolonged
trade war or standoff. For example, when faced with U.S. tariffs
imposed on steel and aluminum imposed in 2018, South Korea
immediately renegotiated the terms of the Korea–United States
Trade Agreement (KORUS) and offered new trade concessions to
the United States.369 South Korea agreed to limit its exports of
steel to 2.68 tons or roughly 70 percent of the volume of steel exports from Korea to the United States for the years 2015–17.370
See id.
Chow & Sheldon, supra note 153, at 38.
365 U.S. Trade Infallibility, supra note 133, at 4.
366 See id. at 18.
367 See Chyzh & Urbatsch, supra note 348, at 10.
368 See supra Section II.B.
369 United States Unilateralism, supra note 34, at 28–29.
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The United States immediately declared that the concessions by
South Korea vindicated its approach.371 Treasury Secretary Steve
Mnuchin boasted, “I think the strategy has worked, quite frankly.
We announced the tariff. We said we were going to proceed. But,
again, we said we’d simultaneously negotiate.”372 Mnuchin claimed
that South Korea’s concessions were a “win-win situation” for both
countries.373 When faced with the same steel and aluminum tariffs,
the EU also swiftly agreed to negotiations, leading the Trump Administration to “declare a resounding victory for Trump and his
confrontational stance.”374 Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross
proclaimed, “[t]his is a real vindication of the president’s trade
policy.”375 Unlike South Korea, the EU had the economic power
to engage in a standoff with the United States, but it lacked the
political will.376
By contrast, China is a nation that has the economic power
to fight a costly trade war. It is also a nation whose leaders, the
Communist Party, cannot accept the perception of being bullied
by the United States, but is willing to play a dangerous game of
mutual destruction instead.377 This Article has indicated that
the U.S.-China trade war was costly to the United States resulting
in a heavy tax on U.S. consumers and losses of at least $7.3 billion in 2018 alone.378 The distribution of the costs of U.S. tariffs
was also unexpected as it was not possible to determine beforehand
that the costs would fall on areas of the United States that were
vital to the political support of the current Administration.379
China’s retaliatory tariffs greatly increased the uncertainties of the costs of the trade war.380 China chose to impose tariffs
in an area to cause maximum pain and distress: agricultural
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373 Id.
374 Trump Declares Victory for Farmers in Trade Spat with EU, EURACTIV
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products and, in particular, U.S. soybean production.381 Coincidentally, the farmers in Midwestern states most affected by the
tariffs were a key constituency that helped propel Trump to the
U.S. presidency in 2016.382 Although China’s imposition of tariffs on U.S. imports would also inflict losses on its consumers,
China was able to avoid many of these losses by finding alternative sources of soybeans from Brazil, and other countries.383 The
loss of its major export markets for soybeans caused serious financial losses for U.S. farmers in the Midwest that may have
contributed to reverses for the Republican Party in the midterm
elections of 2018.384
As both political parties in the United States seem to harbor little affection for China and the WTO, it is far from certain
that the United States will abandon its power-based approach to
trade with China and other countries after the presidential election of 2020, no matter who wins. It was the Democrat Administration of Barack Obama that set in motion the events that led
to the crippling of the WTO dispute settlement system and the
ascendance of the U.S. power-based approach in the legal arena
of international trade dispute resolution.385
The lessons gleaned from this Article suggest that a powerbased approach is most effective when the target of confrontation
trade tactics lacks the economic power, such as South Korea, or
the political will, such as the EU, to engage in a trade standoff
with the United States.386 The United States may be able draw
assurance from the knowledge that many, if not most, other nations fall in either one of these two categories, but China is not
one of them.387
The benefits of using a power-based approach are far less
certain and considerably riskier when faced with an opponent
such as China. With such an opponent, the United States must
carefully assess where the potential economic and political costs
See id.
See id.
383 See supra Part II.
384 See Blanchard et al., supra note 333, at 2.
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will fall but the United States must be cautioned that it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict with accuracy the economic or
political costs of such a battle. There are too many variables to
make such a prediction certain and the power-based approach is
inherently more unpredictable than the negotiation approach of
the WTO that the United States rejects and seeks to replace. It
already appears that the unanticipated economic and political
costs of the China tariffs may have backfired in the 2018 midterm elections and that additional electoral losses might further
ensue.388 The risks of using a power-based approach to trade are
the highest when faced with a country such as China that has
the economic power and political will to endure a prolonged battle and play a dangerous game of mutual pain and destruction
with the United States.
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